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ABSTRACT 
 
Loneliness is associated with paradoxically self-defeating behaviour, in which social contact is 
simultaneously desired and rejected. This behaviour can manifest in various ways. Lonely people 
may, for example, unwittingly decline objectively needed services such as home care. For several 
reasons, lonely older men may be particularly prone to rejecting offers of support. While refusals 
are often seen as a win for the right to live at risk, the victory can be hollow when it does not 
translate into a better quality of life. Often an older man can be persuaded to accept services, but 
sometimes these efforts fail. In such situations, our traditional understanding of the law leaves 
concerned third parties with two undesirable options: take no further action or categorise the 
person as incapable to override his decision-making rights. This dilemma is a sad consequence of 
overcorrecting the medically-dominated approach to elder care with a highly libertarian 
perspective that lets individuals needlessly suffer. In our pursuit of unfettered individualism, the 
law has given insufficient weight to internal constraints such as loneliness which affect one’s 
exercise of free choice, yet keep them below the incapacity threshold. Therefore, in this thesis, I 
propose an intervention approach to loneliness that is not paralysed by the legal fiction of capacity: 
invoking a superior court’s protective jurisdiction. Through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, I 
draw on the evolution of the parens patriae jurisdiction in Canada and a recent line of English case 
law to argue that a superior court’s protective jurisdiction may be used to help lonely older men 
age-in-place. I then propose a framework for invoking the jurisdiction. Specifically, I outline the 
general circumstances in which a court may be justified in exercising the jurisdiction, and I suggest 
that dignity ought to serve as the guiding principle. Then using B.C.’s laws as a point of reference, 
I identify the legislative gap which exists in adult guardianship/protection and mental health laws. 
Next I propose that the jurisdiction ought to be exercised in the most effective, less intrusive 
manner. I conclude with a discussion of some practical challenges of using the jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Doug Surtees, for his support throughout the writing of 
this thesis, as well as my graduate legal studies and involvement in the elder law community on a 
whole. I also thank Professors Mark Carter and Barbara von Tigerstrom for agreeing to sit on my 
committee and for their support and comments along the way. I am also grateful to Professor 
Donna Goodridge, of the University of Saskatchewan’s College of Medicine, for agreeing to be 
my external examiner and for her comments and questions during my defence.  
 I also thank Eddy M. Elmer, Ph.D. student, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, for introducing 
me to the research on the evolutionary model of loneliness and the maladaptive social cognition 
associated with the emotional condition. Any misinterpretation of the material is solely mine.  
 I wish to acknowledge the College of Law for its financial support, and I thank its faculty 
and staff, as well as my LL.M. colleagues, for providing a collegial and supportive environment. 
  
   
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
PERMISSION TO USE ................................................................................................................. i 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ iii 
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...................................................................... 6 
1. Therapeutic jurisprudence ................................................................................................... 6 
2. Universal legal capacity ...................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER II: LONELINESS MATTERS .............................................................................. 13 
1. What is loneliness? ........................................................................................................... 15 
2. Why do we feel lonely? .................................................................................................... 16 
3. Risk factors ....................................................................................................................... 17 
4. Negative associations ........................................................................................................ 20 
CHAPTER III: OLDER MEN – A FORGOTTEN POPULATION ..................................... 24 
1. Who is an older adult? ...................................................................................................... 24 
2. Why older men? ................................................................................................................ 25 
CHAPTER IV: EVOLUTION OF THE PARENS PATRIAE JURISDICTION .................. 33 
1. First generation parens patriae in Canada ........................................................................ 33 
2. Inherent jurisdiction: terminological confusion ................................................................ 35 
3. Protective jurisdiction: the English experience................................................................. 41 
a. Inadvertent loss of parens patriae ............................................................................ 41 
b. Expansion to vulnerable adults ................................................................................. 44 
4. Protective jurisdiction: the Canadian potential ................................................................. 50 
CHAPTER V: PARENS PATRIAE 2.0 – PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION ........................ 54 
1. Proposed framework ......................................................................................................... 55 
a. Circumstances justifying intervention ...................................................................... 55 
b. Dignity as the guiding principle ................................................................................ 61 
c. Legislative gap: lonely older men with capacity ...................................................... 64 
i. Adult guardianship/protection regime .................................................................. 64 
ii. Mental health legislation ....................................................................................... 74 
d. The orders ................................................................................................................. 76 
e. Most effective, less intrusive measures .................................................................... 76 
2. Practical challenges ........................................................................................................... 81 
a. Limited resources ...................................................................................................... 81 
   
 
v 
 
b. Enforceability ............................................................................................................ 82 
c. Service provider safety ............................................................................................. 82 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 84 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 85 
 
 
   
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Loneliness is associated with paradoxically self-defeating behaviour, in which social contact is 
simultaneously desired and rejected.1 This behaviour can manifest in various ways. Lonely people 
may, for example, unwittingly decline objectively needed services such as home care. Lonely men 
may be particularly prone to rejecting offers of support, because of men’s general tendency to 
exhibit less help-seeking behaviour.2 Their resistance to care may also be fueled by the status quo 
bias, which reflects the human preference for maintaining the current state of affairs when faced 
with new options.3 Among lonely older men, the maladaptive behaviours associated with 
loneliness may be further compounded by their shrinking realm of independence, in which their 
physical or cognitive functions may be declining. Faced with diminishing life space, the value of 
remaining choices takes on increased significance and intensity; “[s]mall choices become ‘writ 
large.’”4 Lonely older men may attempt to exert control in any way they can.5 We may dismiss 
them as being self-centred, mean-spirited or cantankerous.6 Others may be labelled as feisty. But 
some lonely older men may be outwardly declining services to protect their remaining shreds of 
independence, despite internally craving support.  
                                                 
1 John T. Cacioppo, Stephanie Cacioppo & Dorret I. Boomsma, “Evolutionary mechanisms for loneliness” (2014) 
28:1 Cognition & Emotion 3 at 9; Louise C. Hawkley & John T. Cacioppo, “Loneliness Matters: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Review of Consequences and Mechanism” (2010) 40 Ann Behav Med 218 [Hawkley & Cacioppo, 
“Loneliness Matters”]; Christopher M. Masi et al, “A Meta-Analysis of Interventions to Reduce Loneliness” 
(August 2011) 15:3 Pers Soc Psychol Rev 219.  
2 Jordan I. Kosberg, “Meeting the Needs of Older Men: Challenges for those in Helping Professions” (2005) 32 J 
Soc & Soc Welfare 9 at 18; Michael E. Addis & James R. Mahalik, “Men, Masculinity, and the Contexts of Help 
Seeking” (2003) 58:1 Am Psychologist 5; Tammi Vacha-Haase, Stephen R. Wester & Heidi Fowell Christianson, 
Psychotherapy with Older Men (New York: Routledge, 2011) at 35-36. But see A. Ekmann, M. Vass & K. Avlund, 
“Preventive home visits to older home-dwelling people in Denmark: are invitational procedures of importance?” 
(2010) 18:6 Health & Soc Care Comm 563 at 569 (higher acceptance rate among men feeling lonely). 
3 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making” (1988) 1:1 J Risk & 
Uncertainty 7 at 8.  
4 Robert L. Rubinstein, Janet C. Kilbride & Sharon Nagy, “Elders Living Alone: Frailty and the Perception of 
Choice” (New York: Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 1992) at 9. See also Patricia A. O’Neill, Caring for the Older Adult: A 
Health Promotion Perspective (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 2002) at 227. 
5 See also Steve Duck, Kris Pond & Geoff Leatham, “Loneliness and the Evaluation of Relational Events” (May 
1994) 11:2 J Soc & Personal Relationships 253 (“lonely men are considerably more aggressive than other men” at 
254); Stephanie Rogers, “Some say Geriatrics is not glamorous, but I say it is” GeriPal Blog (12 November 2014), 
online: <www.geripal.org> (90-year-old hospital patient refusing to let nurses change her soiled underwear because 
the doctor would not let her go home). 
6 See e.g. Matthew D. Lieberman, Social: Why Our Brains are Wired to Connect (New York: Crown Publishers, 
2013) (describing his widowed mother as “self-centered, inattentive, and even mean-spirited at times” at c 1).   
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 While refusals are often seen as a win for the right to live at risk, the victory can be hollow 
when it does not translate into a better quality of life. It is fashionable to say that capable older 
adults are asserting their right to make unwise and risky decisions; that they have freely chosen to 
sacrifice their psychological well-being for independence. But in some cases, the mantra becomes 
hard to defend when we consider the psychological research showing that chronically lonely 
people can become stuck in a vicious cycle of loneliness.7  
 Often an older man can be persuaded to accept services, but sometimes these efforts fail. 
In such situations, our traditional understanding of the law leaves concerned third parties with two 
undesirable options: take no further action or categorise the person as incapable to override his 
decision-making rights.8 The libertarian approach of taking no further action is unsuitable because 
it leaves lonely older men to their own maladaptive cognitive devices. It is problematic to abandon 
symptomatic refusers and let them “rot with their rights on.”9 Yet the paternalistic approach of 
labelling lonely older men as incapable is inappropriate because it is well-established in law that 
making decisions which others deem unwise or risky does not render someone incapable.10 
Further, the incapacity label is stigmatising, and it may be psychologically harmful.11 
Extinguishing a lonely older man’s decision-making rights may also trigger early or unnecessary 
institutionalisation. Case law reveals such an unsettling pattern. Take the situation in which an 
older adult refuses home care and is subsequently found incapable of making a long-term care 
admission decision. Rather than compelling the person to receive home-based services, many cases 
open the door for third parties to force the “incapable” adult into a care home.12 This outcome 
                                                 
7 John T. Cacioppo & Louise C. Hawkley, “Perceived Social Isolation and Cognition” (2009) 13:10 Trends 
Cognitive Sci 13 447 at Figure 3 [J Cacioppo & Hawkley, “Perceived”]. 
8 The lesser known option of supported decision-making may also be available in some jurisdictions (e.g., B.C. 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Yukon), but for the purposes of this thesis, it is difficult to conceptualise how such a 
mechanism would work without implicit coercion when a lonely older man is refusing to participate in the scheme. 
9 See e.g. P.S. Appelbaum & T.G. Gutheil, “‘Rotting with their rights on’: constitutional theory and clinical reality 
in drug refusal by psychiatric patients” (1979) 7:3 Bull Am Academy Psychiatry & L 306. 
10 See Koch (Re) (1997), 33 OR (3d) 485, 1997 CarswellOnt 824 (SC) (WL Canada) at para 54 [Koch]. 
11 See e.g. Bruce J. Winick, “The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental Health 
Law” in David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1996) [Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Key], 17 at 20 & 37 
[Winick, “Side Effects”]; Margaret Hall, “Equity Theory: Responding to the Material Exploitation of the Vulnerable 
but Capable” in Israel Doron, ed, Theories on Law and Ageing: The Jurisprudence of Elder Law (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 2009) [Doron, Theories], 107 at 109 [Hall, “Equity”]; Leslie Salzman, “Rethinking Guardianship (Again): 
Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act” (2010) 81 U Colo L Rev 157 at 169; Annette Johannesen, Janne Petersen & Kirsten Avlund, “Satisfaction in 
Everyday Life for Frail 85-year-old Adults: a Danish Population Study” (2004) 11:3 Scan J Occup Ther 3 at 3. 
12 See below, Chapter V.1.e (Most effective, less intrusive).  
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misses a less intrusive step; it leapfrogs over the option of exhausting the menu of home-based 
services. It manages risk by simply warehousing the person in an institution. 
 Lonely older men face a dire crossroads. Writing on an analogous issue, Atul Gawande 
captures the sentiment in his seminal book, Being Mortal.13 Seeking to improve end-of-life care, 
Dr. Gawande asks, “How did we wind up in a world where the only choices for the very old seem 
to be either going down with the volcano or yielding all control over our lives?”14 This dilemma 
is a sad consequence of overcorrecting the medically-dominated approach to elder care with a 
highly libertarian perspective that lets individuals needlessly suffer. To be clear, I do not take issue 
with the importance of legal safeguards that are in place to protect the rights of capable individuals 
who resist intervention. Rather, I argue that the pendulum has swung too far.15 In our pursuit of 
unfettered individualism, the law has given insufficient weight to internal constraints that affect 
one’s exercise of free choice, yet keep them below the incapacity threshold. I propose that 
loneliness is one such constraint, and that excluding lonely individuals with capacity from the 
ambit of the law’s protective wing is arbitrary. By falling on the “right” side of the fictitious 
capacity/incapacity dichotomy, people stuck in the downward spiral of loneliness become a 
paradoxical casualty of state non-intervention.  
 Therefore, in this thesis, I propose an intervention approach to loneliness that is not 
paralysed by the legal fiction of capacity: invoking a superior court’s protective jurisdiction. 
Drawing on the evolution of the parens patriae jurisdiction in Canada and a recent line of English 
case law, I argue that a superior court’s protective jurisdiction may be used to help lonely older 
men age-in-place by ordering the provision of objectively needed home-based services. The 
suggestion may be startling; the notion that capable older adults have the right to live at risk has 
                                                 
13 (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2014). 
14 Ibid at 68.      
15 For a discussion of the rights-based movement in the 1960s and 1970s that sought greater patient autonomy, see 
David J. Rothman, “The Origins and Consequences of Patient Autonomy: A 25-Year Retrospective” (2001) 9 
Health Care Analysis 255 (“All movements subscribed to a fierce anti-paternalism, a dogged rejection of the 
principles of beneficence” at 256); David B. Wexler, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Culture of Critique” (1999) 
10 J Contemp Legal Issues 263 at 267-68; Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Rights are Not Enough: Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Lessons for Law Reformers” (2002) 18 Touro L Rev 443 at 446-47; Margaret Brazier, “Do No Harm—Do Patients 
Have Responsibilities Too?” (July 2006) 65:2 Cambridge LJ 397 at 398. 
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become deeply embedded in our psyche16 and law.17 But when we take into account the 
maladaptive cognitive effects of loneliness, it would be irresponsible to abandon this group of 
symptomatic refusers.18 
 Given the recent explosion of strategies to combat loneliness, why am I suggesting a legal 
response? The answer is simple: interventions assume a consenting participant. Even the most 
effective strategy (i.e., cognitive behavioural therapy [CBT]) is meaningless if a symptomatic 
refuser does not consent. Unfortunately, our traditional understanding of the law only gives us two 
undesirable ways out of this legal intervention dilemma: either we use the incapacity label or 
mental health legislation to justify interference with the lonely older man’s decision-making rights. 
Using a superior court’s protective jurisdiction offers a third—and less intrusive—option. As I 
discuss below, practical challenges may remain, but from a legal standpoint, intervention attempts 
are no longer stymied by the fictional notion of capacity. 
 This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I sets out the theoretical framework. In 
particular, I discuss therapeutic jurisprudence, which is a psychologically-sensitive way to look at 
the law, and the concept of universal legal capacity. While universal legal capacity has most often 
been invoked to reclaim and protect the decision-making rights of people traditionally labelled as 
incapable, I argue that dissolving the capacity dichotomy may also benefit those who suffer from 
internal decision-making constraints such as loneliness which fall short of the incapacity threshold. 
 Chapter II outlines why loneliness matters. I first define the condition, and then distinguish 
it from objective isolation. I also outline the evolutionary approach to loneliness, which provides 
one explanation for why people feel lonely. Next, I identify five factors which, alone or in 
combination, increase one’s risk for the emotional condition. In particular, I discuss age, gender, 
living alone, health status and personality. I conclude the chapter by outlining the negative 
consequences associated with loneliness, including its effects on mental and physical health, 
service utilisation and social cognition.  
                                                 
16 The phrase appears to be a popular catchphrase, not the precise language used in case law. At the time of writing, 
basic searches in CanLII and Quicklaw for “right to live at risk” returned no cases. “Dignity of risk” returned three 
cases in CanLII: two in relation to wheelchair accessibility and one in relation to child custody. A basic search in 
HeinOnline’s Law Journal Library for “dignity of risk” returned 46 law articles, mostly in relation to disability 
rights and mental health law. “Live at risk” returned five results, none directly on point. 
17 See Koch, supra note 10 at para 21.  
18 See e.g. Emily White, Lonely: Learning to Live with Solitude (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2011) (leaving 
lonely people to fend for themselves tends to result in little change and therefore, we should not walk way but take 
active measures to help them, at 277). 
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 Chapter III addresses my rationale for focusing on older men. First, I identify what I mean 
by “older adult.” Second, I explain the four factors which have compelled me to write about older 
men: the feminisation of elder advocacy; men’s less help-seeking behaviour; the family-oriented 
approach to law and policy; and the marginalising effects of the active aging approach.  
 Chapter IV demonstrates the recent evolution of the parens patriae jurisdiction in Canada. 
In particular, I argue that some courts have departed from the strict understanding that the 
jurisdiction can only be exercised when they make a formal finding of incapacity. I begin the 
chapter with a general discussion of “first generation” parens patriae in Canada, and then explore 
the terminological confusion surrounding the concept of inherent jurisdiction. I argue that inherent 
jurisdiction is something more than a source of procedural powers; that is, it can be invoked to 
affect substantive matters. Next, I discuss several cases in which the English High Court has 
exercised its protective jurisdiction over vulnerable adults who do not lack capacity. I then turn to 
a line of Canadian cases which have laid the groundwork for what I refer to as “second generation” 
parens patriae, or the superior courts’ protective jurisdiction over vulnerable adults.  
 Chapter V sets out my proposed framework for invoking a superior court’s protective 
jurisdiction over lonely older men who do not lack capacity but are symptomatically refusing 
objectively needed home-based services. First, I outline the general circumstances in which a court 
may be justified in exercising its protective jurisdiction. While some situations may be classified 
as “self-neglect,” I explain that I am referring more generally to the rejection of services which 
purport to facilitate aging-in-place. Second, I suggest that dignity ought to serve as the guiding 
principle. Third, I identify the legislative gap which currently exists in adult 
guardianship/protection and mental health laws. To provide structure, I conduct my gap analysis 
with reference to B.C.’s legislation. Fourth, I review the general nature of protective jurisdiction 
orders. Fifth, I propose that the protective jurisdiction ought to be exercised in the most effective, 
less intrusive manner. Too often “most effective, less intrusive” language is merely rhetoric; 
invoking the superior court’s protective jurisdiction has the potential to result in more effective 
and less intrusive intervention than currently happens when an older adult is refusing in-home 
services. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of three practical challenges of effectively using 
the protective jurisdiction: limited resources; enforceability; and service provider safety. 
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CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of my thesis. First, I discuss therapeutic 
jurisprudence, which embraces the use of psychological research in legal writing, and ultimately 
seeks more therapeutic applications of the law. Second, I discuss universal legal capacity, and the 
benefits of dissolving the capacity dichotomy for those who suffer from internal decision-making 
constraints such as loneliness which fall short of the incapacity threshold.  
 
1. Therapeutic jurisprudence 
Developed by American scholars David Wexler and Bruce Winick, therapeutic jurisprudence is a 
thoroughly interdisciplinary field of study that examines the law’s often overlooked impact on 
psychological well-being.19 It broadly defines “the law” to include legal rules, legal procedures, 
and the roles and behaviours of legal actors (e.g., lawyers and judges).20 Unlike traditional 
doctrinal analysis, which typically involves precedent and analogical reasoning, TJ draws upon 
empirical-based social science research to explore how the law, as a potential instrument of 
healing, may be developed, reformed and applied in a manner which produces positive therapeutic 
outcomes (and minimises anti-therapeutic consequences).21 Rather than viewing the law as 
something that inevitably makes people’s lives worse, TJ sees the law as having potential 
therapeutic value.22 That is, the law has the potential to positively affect the emotional lives of 
people who bump into “sharp legal things.”23 By improving the law’s role as a therapeutic agent,24 
TJ can help find ways to blunt those edges.  
                                                 
19 David B. Wexler, “Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence” in David B. 
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic 
Press, 1991) [Wexler & Winick, Essays] at 8 [Wexler, “Putting”]. 
20 David B. Wexler, “From theory to practice and back again in therapeutic jurisprudence: now comes the hard part” 
(March 2011) 37:1 Monash UL Rev 33 at 33 [Wexler, “Theory”]. 
21 Wexler, “Putting”, supra note 19 at 8 & 13; Bruce J. Winick, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victims of Crime” 
in Edna Erez, Michael Kichling & Jo-Anne Wemmers, eds, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victim Participation in 
Justice: International Perspectives (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2011), 3 at 3. TJ shares similarities 
with the public health concept of “the social determinants of health” (SDOH), which are the conditions, forces, 
policies and systems that shape people’s health. While law is rarely identified as a SDOH, it is arguable that it is one 
of the social forces or living conditions (social determinants) in society which impact people’s well-being.  
22 See e.g. David B. Wexler, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Comparative Law Context” (1997) 15 Behav Sci & L 
233 at 234. 
23 I borrow this phrase from Stephen Wexler, “Practicing Law for Poor People” (1970) 79 Yale L J 1049 at 1050. 
24 See e.g. David B. Wexler, “Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (February 
1992) 16:1 Law & Human Behav 27 at 32 [Wexler, “Mental Health”]. 
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 When TJ first emerged about 25 years ago,25 it was initially applied to mental health law.26 
Since then, the approach has been used in many other legal areas, and it is now understood to be 
“a psychologically sensitive way to look at virtually all aspects of law and justice.”27 Within law 
and aging, TJ has been applied to professional ethics in elder law practice;28 theoretical approaches 
to elder law;29 clinical legal education;30 the medicalization of aging;31 older drivers, public health 
and community safety;32 end-of-life decision-making;33 testamentary capacity and undue 
influence;34 adult protective proceedings;35 tort liability and Alzheimer’s disease;36 and nursing 
home regulation.37 There is a dearth of law and aging literature on loneliness and the legal 
significance of its paradoxically self-defeating behaviour. 
 Rooted in a realist law reform agenda,38 TJ analyses whether positive psychological 
outcomes can be achieved through the creative (i.e., more therapeutic) application of existing laws, 
or if new laws are needed to produce therapeutic effects.39 Wexler argues that reforms aimed at 
applying existing laws more therapeutically are likely to be “far easier” to advance and less 
controversial than formal legislative reform, and consequently, there may be a greater chance that 
                                                 
25 Ibid at 33. 
26 See Wexler, “Putting”, supra note 19 at 8. 
27 Edna Erez, Michael Kilchling & Jo-Anne Wemmers, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victim Participation in 
Justice: An Introduction” in Erez, Kichling & Wemmers, supra note 21, ix at x. See also David B. Wexler, “The 
Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice” (1999) 68:3 Revista Juridica UPR 691 at 696.   
28 Dennis P. Stolle, “Professional Responsibility in Elder Law: A Synthesis of Preventive Law and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence” (Fall 1996) 14:4 Behav Sci & L 459. 
29 Marshall B. Kapp, “A Therapeutic Approach” in Doron, Theories, supra note 11, 31 [Kapp, “Therapeutic”]. 
30 Cindy E. Faulkner, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law in the Thomas M. Cooley Sixty Plus, Inc., 
Elder Law Clinic” (Spring 2005) 17:3 St. Thomas Law Rev 685. 
31 Winsor C. Schmidt, “Medicalization of Aging: The Upside and the Downside” (Fall 2011) 13:1 Marquette Elder’s 
Advisor 55. 
32 Bruce J. Winick & Alina M. Perez, “Aging, Driving, and Public Health: A Therapeutic Approach” (Winter 2010) 
11:2 Fla Coastal L Rev 189. 
33 Thomas L. Hafemeister, “End-of-Life Decision Making, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Preventive Law: 
Hierarchical v. Consensus-Based Decision-Making Model” (1999) 41:2 Ariz L Rev 329. 
34 Daniel C. Marson, Justin S. Huthwaite & Katina Herbert, “Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence in the 
Elderly: A Jurisprudent Theory Perspective” (2004) 28 Law & Psychol Rev 71. 
35 Jennifer L. Wright, “Protecting Who From What, And Why, And How?: A Proposal for An Integrative Approach 
to Adult Protective Proceedings” (2004) 12 Elder LJ 53 [Wright, “Protecting”]. 
36 Edward P. Richards, “Public Policy Implications of Liability Regimes for Injuries caused by Persons with 
Alzheimer’s Disease” (Winter 2001) 35:2 Ga L Rev 621. 
37 Marshall B. Kapp, “Quality of Care and Quality of Life in Nursing Facilities: What’s Regulation Got to Do with 
It” (Spring 2000) 31:3 McGeorge L Rev 707. 
38 Kapp, “Therapeutic”, supra note 29 at 31. 
39 David B. Wexler, “Applying the Law Therapeutically” in Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Key, supra note 11, 831 
at 841 [Wexler, “Applying”]; David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, “Introduction” in Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic 
Key, ibid, xvii at vxii; Des Rosiers, supra note 15. 
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such proposals will achieve the desired change.40 Therefore, Wexler urges TJ proponents to 
explicitly discuss, research and write about the ways in which existing laws can possibly be applied 
in a more creative and therapeutic manner.41 While not uncontroversial, this is the approach I have 
taken in this thesis. Rather than proposing legislative reform, I argue that, through the combined 
effect of the evolution of the parens patriae jurisdiction and the emerging line of English protective 
jurisdiction case law, superior courts in Canada have an existing jurisdiction to intervene in the 
lives of capable lonely older men who are symptomatically refusing objectively needed home-
based services. Exercising this jurisdiction has the potential to improve their quality of life. 
 TJ is not without its critics. John Petrila argues that the approach suffers from the 
underlying assumption that researchers and lawyers (as opposed to mental health patients, etc.) 
decide whether a particular law has therapeutic value.42 Similarly, Dennis Roderick and Susan 
Krumholz question how TJ defines and determines what is therapeutic;43 they observe that TJ’s 
preferred therapeutic outcomes have no independent, inherent basis, but instead, are socially 
constructed by the approach’s proponents.44 These criticisms have merit. Take the example of the 
alleged therapeutic value of patient “voice” in civil commitment hearings.45 Enhancing procedural 
practices to allow for greater patient participation may satiate legal professionals, but the changes 
may make little difference to those who experience the same end result: involuntary detention.46 
In response to these critiques, Wexler and Winick emphasize that nothing in their work suggests 
that lawyers, researchers or other professionals should propose law reform without regard to the 
patient perspective.47  
                                                 
40 Wexler, “Applying”, ibid at 841. 
41 Ibid. 
42 John Petrila, “Book Review of Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Review of Essays in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence” (1993) 10 NYL Sch J Hum Rts 890. 
43 Dennis Roderick & Susan T. Krumholz, “Much Ado About Nothing? A Critical Examination of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence” (2006) 1 S New Eng Roundtable Symposium LJ 201. 
44 Ibid at 208. See also Stolle, supra note 28. 
45 See e.g. Tom R. Tyler, “The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil 
Commitment Hearings” (1992) 46 SMU L Rev 433 at 439-40. See also Bruce J. Winick, “On Autonomy: Legal and 
Psychological Perspectives” (1992) 37:6 Vill L Rev 1705 at 1755-68 (psychological value of patient choice).  
46 Compare Jack Susman, “Resolving hospital conflicts: a study on therapeutic jurisprudence” (1994) 22 J 
Psychiatry & L 107 (patients could judge procedures fair even when the result was unfavourable from their 
standpoint, at 121). 
47 David B. Wexler, “Patients, Professionals, and the Path of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Response to Petrila” 
(1993) 10 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 907 at 908 [Wexler, “Patients”]; Bruce J. Winick, “The 
Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (1997) 3:1 Psychol Pub Pol’y & L 184 at 195 [Winick, 
“Jurisprudence”]. 
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 Further, Wexler and Winick argue that therapeutic outcomes must not be achieved at the 
expense of traditional legal principles such as autonomy.48 But if autonomy always trumps, then 
TJ provides little help in resolving the tension between achieving therapeutic goals (e.g., 
protection) and safeguarding other values (e.g., autonomy), unless one takes the fashionable 
position of arguing that the law’s unwavering commitment to autonomy is therapeutic.49 Winick 
concedes that when values conflict, TJ is not a way to resolve the dilemma; rather, one must go 
outside of the approach and look to an ethical or political theory which sets out a hierarchy of 
values.50 In Chapter V, I explore the perennial conflict between protection and autonomy, and 
propose that we overcome the tension by using dignity as the guiding principle when a court is 
determining whether to exercise its protective jurisdiction over a lonely older man.   
 Another criticism of TJ is that it has poor theoretical quality because it is not presented in 
a manner which allows it to be refuted, and therefore, it difficult to empirically study the 
application of its therapeutic constructs.51 However, TJ scholars have tended to “retreat” from the 
suggestion that TJ is a theory.52 For instance, Wexler observes: 
[TJ] is not and never pretended to be a full-blown ‘theory.’ More properly, and 
more modestly, it is simply a ‘field of inquiry’—in essence a research agenda—
focusing attention on the often overlooked area of the impact of the law on 
psychological wellbeing and the like. From the very beginning, however, TJ has 
sought to work with frameworks or heuristics to organise and guide thought.53 
 
Therefore, rather than characterising TJ as a theory, it is preferable to describe it as a psycho-legal 
“lens” or perspective through which one examines the law’s potential therapeutic effectiveness.54  
 
2. Universal legal capacity 
The capacity dichotomy assumes a bright line between those with and without capacity. This 
assumption is not remedied by replacing the global capacity model with the functional approach, 
which recognizes task-specific decision-making (e.g., you may be capable of making some 
                                                 
48 Wexler, “Mental Health”, supra note 24 at 32; Winick, “Jurisprudence”, ibid at 191-92; David B. Wexler, 
“Therapeutic Justice” (1972) 57 Minn L Rev 289 at 294-95; Wexler, “Patients”, ibid at 907-08. 
49 See Winick, “Jurisprudence”, ibid at 191-92.  
50 Ibid at 197-98. 
51 Roderick & Krumholz, supra note 43 at 205-07 & 214-15. 
52 Nigel Stobbs, “The Nature of Juristic Paradigms: Exploring the Theoretical and Conceptual Relationship between 
Adversarialism and Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (2011) 4:1 Wash U Jurisprudence Rev 97 at 106. 
53 Wexler, “Theory”, supra note 20 at 33 [footnotes omitted]. 
54 See e.g. Winick, “Jurisprudence”, supra note 47. 
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decisions but not others) and capacity’s fluctuating nature (e.g., you may have capacity to instruct 
counsel in the morning but not in the late afternoon).55 While the functional approach is preferable 
to the global model, people still fall on either side of the capacity dichotomy, albeit in a more 
nuanced, decision-specific way. There remains a binary division between those with and without 
capacity; individuals on the “wrong” side are still labeled as incompetent—an outcome which has 
several potential adverse effects such as stigmatisation and the deprivation of liberty.56 
Unsurprisingly, the dominant understanding of capacity is increasingly being viewed as arbitrary, 
outdated,57 and from a TJ perspective, anti-therapeutic.58 In its place, there is emerging support for 
the concept of universal legal capacity, which views capacity as an intrinsic characteristic that 
applies universally to all individuals, regardless of the nature and level of their impairment.59 
Under this approach, legal capacity is not something to be taken away; rather, it is an inalienable 
right for everyone, including persons with disabilities.  
 The notion of universal legal capacity is most often invoked to reclaim and safeguard the 
decision-making rights of adults traditionally labelled as incapable. For instance, the concept is 
captured in Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
which calls on state parties to “recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an 
equal basis with others in all aspects of life,” and to “take appropriate measures to provide access 
by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.”60 
Article 12 is considered a key driver behind the establishment of domestic supported decision-
                                                 
55 See e.g. CD (Re), 2014 CanLII 32644 (ON CCB) (“It is trite to say that capacity to consent is not fixed in time or 
context. A person may be capable of consenting to one kind of treatment, but not to another, and may be capable of 
consenting at one time but not at another, even within relatively short intervals” at 11). 
56 See Winick, “Side Effects”, supra note 11 at 38; WA-D (Re), 2011 CanLII 59065 (ON CCB) (involuntary patient 
with delusional disorder expressed outrage at being labelled as a psychiatric patient, refused to cooperate with care 
and confined himself to bed for 23 hours per day). 
57 See Doug Surtees, “Constructing Incapacity: Deconstructing Capacity in Adult Guardianship” in A. Kimberley 
Dayton, ed, Comparative Perspectives on Adult Guardianship (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2014), 273 
at 273. 
58 Winick, “Side Effects”, supra note 11 at 27 & 37; David B. Wexler, “Practising Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies” in Dennis P. Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds, Practising 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping Profession (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2000), 45 at 53. 
59 Camilla Kong, “The Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Article 12: Prospective Feminist 
Lessons against the ‘Will and Preferences’ Paradigm” (2015) 4 Laws 709 at 710. See also Amita Dhanda, 
“Universal Legal Capacity as a Universal Human Right” in Michael Dudley, Derrick Silove & Fran Gale, eds, 
Mental Health and Human Rights: Vision, Praxis and Courage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 177. 
60 13 December 2006, GA Res A/RES/61/106, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, arts 12(2)-(3) (ratified by Canada 11 March 
2010, reserving the right to continue to use substitute decision-making). 
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making regimes,61 which allow traditionally-labelled “incapable” adults to receive assistance from 
another person so they can make and communicate their own decisions.62 This approach differs 
from the draconian nature of substitute decision-making, which usurps an adult’s right to make 
decisions and hands that power to someone else.63 Further, supported decision-making abandons 
the stigmatising outcome of labelling a person as incapable;64 instead of viewing the individual as 
incapable, it places the source of incapacity within the decision-making process itself.65 This 
approach is rooted in the social model of disability; the question is whether the surrounding 
environment, as opposed to the person, is “capable” of supporting the individual make and 
communicate a decision. If not, the environment must be changed so the person has the appropriate 
decision-making supports.66  
 While dissolving the capacity dichotomy has its obvious benefits for adults traditionally 
labelled as incapable, it may also improve the law’s response to adults who suffer from internal 
decision-making constraints such as loneliness which fall short of the incapacity threshold. 
Without an arbitrary line dividing those with and without capacity, it becomes difficult to justify 
non-intervention (abandonment) simply on the grounds that a person possesses the fictional notion 
of capacity. Something more is needed. Libertarians might argue that a lonely older man is making 
an autonomous free choice, but as relational theorists observe, this perspective mistakenly assumes 
that people are independent—as opposed to interdependent—beings.67 In rejecting the overly 
individualistic liberal actor, the relational theory of autonomy acknowledges that social situations 
                                                 
61 Shih-Nigh Then, “Evolution and Innovation in Guardianship Laws: Assisted Decision-Making” (2013) 35 Sydney 
L Rev 133 at 146. For examples of supported decision-making in Canada, see Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship 
Act, SA 2008, c A-4.2; Representation Agreement Act, RSBC 1996, c 405 [RAA]; The Adult Guardianship and Co-
decision-making Act, SS 2000, c A-5.3; Adult Protection and Decision Making Act, SY 2003, c 21, Sch A. 
62 See Robert M. Gordon, “The Emergence of Assisted (Supported) Decision-Making in the Canadian Law of Adult 
Guardianship and Substitute Decision-Making” (2000) 23:1 Intl J L & Psychiatry 61 at 69. 
63 Surtees, supra note 57 at 275. 
64 See Sarah Burningham, “Developments in Canadian Adult Guardianship and Co-Decision-Making Law” (2009) 
18 Dal J Leg Stud 119 at 123. 
65 See Surtees, supra note 57 at 279 & 282; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Monitoring the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Guidance for Human Rights Monitors” (New York: United 
Nations, 2010) at 8. 
66 See Surtees, ibid at 282. 
67 See Françoise Baylis, “The Self in Situ: A Relational Account of Personal Identity” in Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer 
L. Llewellyn, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2012), 109 at 109 & 112; Jennifer L. Llewellyn, “Restorative Justice: Thinking Relationally about Justice” in 
Downie & Llewellyn, ibid, 89 at 90; Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, “Contingent participation and coercive 
care: Feminist and communitarian theories of disability and legal capacity” in Bernadette McSherry & Ian 
Freckelton, eds, Coercive Care: Rights, Law and Policy (New York: Routledge, 2013), 31 at 34. 
   
 
12 
 
(including relationships and pressures) affect personal decision-making.68 A classic example is the 
capable woman who decides to remain in an abusive spousal relationship, and refuses offers of 
support (e.g., help with obtaining a restraining order).69 Her decisions may be objectively unwise, 
but from the liberal individualist perspective, they are considered to be freely made choices.70 This 
approach fails to appreciate that her decisions may actually arise from her contextual or situational 
vulnerability, which stem from the relationship itself.71 It is problematic to exclude her from 
protective action simply because she retains capacity in the traditional sense. As Martha Minow 
writes about the concept of constrained choice:    
A recent threat to individual freedoms and human rights, perhaps ironically, stems 
from a tendency among many judges and officials to assert that someone has a 
choice. While laudable for the respect it seems to accord individuals, the legal 
rhetoric of choice—including discussions of voluntariness—is too often used to 
assign responsibility to someone who had little power to choose….72 
 
Contextual decision-making constraints may be external (e.g., an abusive spouse), but in some 
cases, the predator may be found within the person. In this thesis, I present loneliness as an internal 
decision-making constraint that may justify a court to intervene in a “capable” adult’s life.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
68 See Llewellyn & Downie, ibid at 7; Lucy-Ann Buckley, “Relational Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the Supreme 
Court of Canada” (2015) 29 Can J Fam L 251 at 253; Lord & Stein, ibid at 31-34. 
69 See Margaret Hall, “Material Exploitation and the Autonomy Ideal: The Role of Equity Theory in Adult 
Protection Legislation” (2008) 5 Elder L Rev 9. 
70 Ibid.            
71 Ibid.          
72 Martha Minow, “Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall” (1991) 80 Geo LJ 2093 at 2093-94. 
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CHAPTER II: LONELINESS MATTERS 
Loneliness is an emotional pain that few of us have escaped. For most, the experience is fleeting. 
We may feel a pang of loneliness after moving to a new city or when travelling alone. Feelings of 
loneliness may surge after losing a spouse, outliving close friends or residing far from family. For 
others, the condition is chronic. In its unrelenting form, loneliness has been associated with several 
serious health conditions; its damage is comparable to smoking 15 cigarettes a day.73 Loneliness 
has also been linked to increased service utilisation, and paradoxically self-defeating behaviour.74 
Given the high personal, societal and financial toll of loneliness, it is no surprise that the condition 
has become a topic du jure.75 As the population ages, governments and advocacy groups have 
placed particular emphasis on later life loneliness,76 with British Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt 
calling the epidemic of lonely older adults a “national shame.”77 Yet many of the well-intentioned 
                                                 
73 Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Timothy B. Smith & J. Bradley Layton, “Social Relationships and Mortality Risk: A 
Meta-Analytic Review” (2010) 7:7 PLoS Med doi:10.1371/ journal.pmed.1000316 at Figure 6. See below, Chapter 
II.4 (Negative associations). 
74 See below, Chapter II.4 (Negative associations). 
75 Loneliness received relatively ample attention from social scientists in the 1970s and 80s. The recent surge of 
interest is likely due in part to newer studies linking loneliness to serious health problems. Examples from the earlier 
period include Robert S. Weiss, Loneliness: The Experience of Emotional and Social Isolation (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1973) (loneliness is a “chronic disease without redeeming features” at 15); Letitia Anne Peplau & 
Daniel Perlman, eds, Loneliness: A Sourcebook of Current Theory, Research and Therapy (Toronto: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 1982); Mohammadreza Hojat & Rick Crandall, eds, Loneliness: Theory, Research, and Applications 
(Newbury Park: Select Press, 1989). See also U.S. President’s Commission on Mental Health (1978) cited in 
Stephanie Cacioppo et al, “Loneliness: Clinical Import and Interventions” (2015) 10:2 Perspectives on Psychol Sci 
238 at 239 & 244 (importance of easing the pain of those suffering from loneliness).  
76 See National Seniors Council, “Report on the Social Isolation of Seniors 2013-2014” (October 2014), online: 
Government of Canada <www.seniorscouncil.gc.ca> (social isolation increases likelihood of loneliness, at 1); 
Government of Canada, News Release, “National Seniors Council to further examine social isolation of seniors” (12 
March 2015), online: <http://news.gc.ca>; Employment and Social Development Canada, Seniors, “Funding: Pan-
Canadian Projects”, online: <www.esdc.gc.ca> (call for proposals for pan-Canadian projects that address social 
isolation among older adults); B.C. Ministry of Health, Children’s, Women’s and Seniors Health Branch, “Social 
Isolation Among Seniors: An Emerging Issue” (March 2004), online: <http://www.health.gov.bc.ca>; Age-Friendly 
Manitoba, “Let No One Be Alone Week—A Time to Reach Out to Isolated Seniors, May 5-11” (15 April 2013), 
online: <http://www.agefriendlymanitoba.ca>; Knowledge Networks & Insight Policy Research, “Loneliness among 
Older Adults: A National Survey of Adults 45+” (September 2010), online: AARP <www.aarp.org> (AARP-
commissioned national survey on loneliness and social isolation in the U.S.); Campaign to End Loneliness, “About 
the campaign”, online: <www.campaigntoendloneliness.org/> (joint campaign in the U.K. to end later life 
loneliness); The Sporting Memories Foundation, “The Foundation”, online: <www.sportingmemoriesnetwork.com> 
(tackling dementia, depression and loneliness by engaging older adults in social activities and helping them recall 
sporting memories); Statistics New Zealand, Loneliness in New Zealand: Findings from the 2010 NZ General Social 
Survey (April 2013), online: <www.stats.govt.nz> (11 percent of older people feel lonely all, most or some of the 
time, at 5); Talia Shadwell, “Funding for study to compare aged New Zealanders’ loneliness with rest of world” 
Stuff (15 March 2016), online: <www.stuff.co.nz> (New Zealand to fund study comparing loneliness among older 
New Zealanders with data from 29 European countries). 
77 Jeremy Hunt quoted in Oliver Wright, “Jeremy Hunt blasts British society’s neglect of its elderly” Independent 
(17 October 2013), online: <http://www.independent.co.uk>.  
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initiatives to tackle loneliness do not address the maladaptive social cognition which plagues 
chronic sufferers, and imprisons them in a vicious cycle. Instead, loneliness interventions typically 
aim to increase social contact, enhance social support or improve social skills, but evidence of 
their effectiveness is limited, if not weak.78 For example, consistent with the active aging 
approach,79 volunteering is often touted as a loneliness remedy. But this activity is no antidote.80 
While it may work for some, it can leave others “feeling doubly alone.”81 As Robert Weiss 
observed in his seminal book on the emotional affliction, only the non-lonely suppose that 
loneliness can be cured by “random sociability;” advising lonely people to “be pleasant, outgoing, 
interested in others” seems “oddly beside the point.”82 Unsurprisingly, a recent meta-analysis of 
loneliness interventions found that the most effective interventions address the lonely person’s 
                                                 
78 See e.g. Gavin J. Andrews et al, “Assisting friendships, combating loneliness: users’ view on a ‘befriending’ 
scheme” (2003) 23:3 Ageing & Society 349 at 360 (befriending scheme demonstrating some value, at 355); R. 
Honigh-de Vlaming et al, “Acceptability of the Components of a Loneliness Intervention Among Elderly Dutch 
People: A Qualitative Study” (May/June 2013) 44:3 American J Health Ed 136 (limited evidence on home visits is 
mostly weak or confined to specific groups, such as older Moroccan immigrants or older adults living in dispersed 
rural settings, at 144); British Geriatrics Society, Newsletter, “GP loneliness scheme cuts fifth of consultations with 
older patients” (June 2015), online: <www.bgs.org.uk> (older lonely patients participated in social events such as 
tea parties; family doctors reported a 20 percent drop in office visits, at 32); Age UK & the Isles of Scilly, “People, 
Place, Purpose: Shaping services around people and communities through the Newquay Pathfinder” (2014), online: 
<www.ageuk.org.uk> (older adults at high risk of being admitted to hospital were visited by volunteers; early results 
included a 30 percent reduction in emergency admissions); Chris Dayson, Nadia Bashir & Sarah Pearson, “From 
dependence to independence: emerging lessons from the Rotherham Social Prescribing Pilot – Summary Report” 
(December 2013), online: <www.shu.ac.uk/> (patients at risk of unplanned hospital admission and in need of non-
medical home support were provided time-limited services such as befriending; emergency department visits fell by 
up to 20 percent, at 1); Kali S. Thomas, Ucheoma Akobundu & David Dosa, “More than a Meal? A Randomized 
Control Trial Comparing the Effects of Home-Delivered Meals Programs on Participants’ Feelings of Loneliness” 
(26 November 2015) J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci doi: 10.1093/geronb/gbv111 (homebound older adults 
receiving meals on wheels had lower loneliness scores than those who remained on the waiting list). There is also 
limited research on pet-based interventions: see e.g. Jitka Pikhartova, Ann Bowling & Christina Victor, “Does 
owning a pet protect older people against loneliness?” (20 September 2014) 14 BMC Geriatrics 106 (compared to 
women, men may find pet-based interventions less appropriate, at 110). But see Sarah Knapton, “Lonely elderly 
given hens to keep them company” The Telegraph (20 July 2015), online: <www.telegraph.co.uk>. 
79 See below, Chapter III.2 (Why older men?). 
80 See e.g. Weiss, supra note 75 at 17; Warren H. Jones, “Loneliness and Social Behavior” in Peplau & Perlman, 
supra note 75, 238 at 246. Compare John T. Cacioppo & William Patrick, Loneliness: Human Nature and the Need 
for Social Connection (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008) (volunteering benefits older adults’ health and well-being, 
and adds to the purpose, meaning and satisfaction of their lives, at 233). 
81 White, supra note 18 at 308.  
82 Weiss, supra note 75 at 13 & 17.       
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maladaptive social cognition, by directly targeting the negative feedback loop perpetuating the 
condition.83 The results suggest that interventions which use CBT can reduce loneliness.84  
 This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I define loneliness, and then distinguish it 
from objective isolation. Second, I outline the evolutionary approach to loneliness, which provides 
one explanation for why people feel lonely. Third, I identify five factors which increase one’s risk 
for the emotional pain: age, gender, living alone, health status and personality. Fourth, I discuss 
the negative consequences associated with loneliness, including its effects on mental and physical 
health, service utilisation and social cognition.  
 
1. What is loneliness? 
While there are several definitions of loneliness, it is generally understood to be an unpleasant and 
distressing personal experience of unwanted discrepancies between existing and preferred 
relationships.85 The mismatch between actual and desired connections is a subjective phenomenon; 
that is, it is based on the lonely person’s own perceptions of his or her social world.86 While 
loneliness is a near-universal experience, it is often situational,87 sometimes surging after stressful 
life events such as the death of a spouse or close friend.88 The feeling is usually time-limited, 
subsiding once the person reconnects with others.89 But for some people, loneliness is unrelenting. 
Chronic loneliness has been defined as having a lack of satisfying relationships for two or more 
consecutive years.90   
                                                 
83 Masi et al, supra note 1 at 259. See also Megan L. Knowles et al, “Choking Under Social Pressure: Social 
Monitoring Among the Lonely” (June 2015) 41:6 Personality & Soc Psychol Bulletin 805 at 806. Compare Andy P. 
Dickens et al, “Interventions targeting social isolation in older people: a systematic review” (2011) 11 BMC Pub 
Health 647 at 666 (effective isolation and loneliness interventions offer social activity and/or support within a group 
format). 
84 Masi, ibid at 256. 
85 Brita Nilsson, Unni A. Lindstrom & Dagfinn Naden, “Is loneliness a psychological dysfunction? A literary study 
of the phenomenon of loneliness” (March 2006) 20:1 Scandinavian J Caring Sci 93 at 94; Pikhartova, Bowling & 
Victor, supra note 78 at 106; Ye Luo et al, “Loneliness, health, and mortality in old age: A national longitudinal 
study” (2012) 74 Social Science & Medicine 907 at 907; Dickens et al, supra note 83 at 648. See generally Peplau & 
Perlman, supra note 75. 
86 Keming Yang & Christina R. Victor, “The prevalence of and risk factors for loneliness among older people in 
China” (April 2008) 28:3 Ageing & Society 305 at 306. 
87 Pamela Qualter et al, “Loneliness Across the Life Span” (2015) 10:2 Perspectives on Psychol Sci 250 at 250. 
88 Sharon Shiovitz-Ezra & Liat Ayalon, “Situational versus chronic loneliness as risk factors for all-cause mortality” 
(2010) 22:3 Intl Psychogeriatrics 455 at 456. 
89 Qualter et al, supra note 87 at 250; Shiovitz-Ezra & Ayalon, ibid at 456. 
90 Jeffrey E. Young, “Loneliness, Depression and Cognitive Therapy: Theory and Application” in Peplau & 
Perlman, supra note 75, 379 at 382. 
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 The subjective aspect of loneliness distinguishes it from objective isolation, which refers 
to the actual number of social contacts.91 Loneliness is about the quality of relationships; isolation 
is about quantity. Therefore, a person can be alone without being lonely, and an individual in a 
group setting (e.g., residential care) can experience loneliness.92 Compared to isolation, loneliness 
is difficult to measure because it is a self-reported subjective feeling.93 Another difference between 
loneliness and isolation is that while individuals may want to have a small number of social 
contacts, they do not choose to be lonely—loneliness is always involuntary.94  
  
2. Why do we feel lonely? 
According to an emerging evolutionary approach, loneliness might feel like a blight without any 
redeeming features, but it may play an important role in human evolution.95 The theory posits that 
the painful feelings of loneliness motivate people to reconnect with others, thereby increasing their 
chances of survival and reproduction.96 It suggests that the emotional pain triggers an “aversive 
signal” which warns us that our social connection to others is in jeopardy, and that we must change 
our behaviour to survive, prosper and procreate.97 Similar to hunger and thirst, which motivate us 
to find food and water, loneliness drives us to repair broken relationships and maintain existing 
ones which are needed for health and well-being, as well as ensuring a genetic legacy.98  
 
                                                 
91 Nilsson, Lindstrom & Naden, supra note 85; Luo et al, supra note 85; Dellmar Walker & Roy E. Beauchene, “The 
Relationship of Loneliness, Social Isolation, and Physical Health to Dietary Adequacy of Independently Living 
Elderly” in Lawrence A. Frolik, ed, Aging and the Law: An Interdisciplinary Reader (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1999), 568 at 568; Hawkley & Cacioppo, “Loneliness Matters”, supra note 1 at 218. 
92 See Christina R. Victor, “Loneliness in care homes: a neglected area of research?” (2012) 8:6 Aging Health 637 
(prevalence of severe loneliness among care home residents is at least double that of community-dwelling older 
adults). 
93 Liesl M. Heinrich & Eleonora Gullone, “The clinical significance of loneliness: A literature review” (October 
2006) 26:6 Clinical Psychol Rev 695 at 711. While there are several loneliness scales, the most commonly used is 
the UCLA Loneliness Scale: ibid at 700.  
94 Luo et al, supra note 85 at 907; Dickens et al, supra note 83 at 648; Ethel Mannin, Loneliness: A Study of the 
Human Condition (Toronto: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers Ltd., 1966) at 11.         
95 J Cacioppo, S Cacioppo & Boomsma, supra note 1 at 3 & 7; Luc Goossens et al, “The Genetics of Loneliness: 
Linking Evolutionary Theory to Genome-Wide Genetics, Epigenetics, and Social Science” (2015) 10:2 Perspectives 
on Psychol Sci 213 at 214; Gillian A. Matthews et al, “Dorsal Raphe Dopamne Neurons Represent the Experience 
of Social Isolation” (2016) 164:4 Cell 617. 
96 J Cacioppo, S Cacioppo & Boomsma, ibid at 7. 
97 Ibid at 3, 7 & 14.              
98 Ibid at 7-8.                        
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3. Risk factors 
Humans are social animals, and the need to belong is present across the lifespan.99 Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that loneliness can affect anyone; it does not discriminate.100 However, several factors 
alone and in combination increase one’s risk for the affliction. In this section, I briefly look at five 
risk factors for loneliness: age, gender, living alone, health status and personality.  
 Contrary to popular belief, loneliness is not restricted to old age.101 Children as young as 
five have reported feeling lonely.102 The age distribution of the emotional condition has been 
described as U-shaped, with rates peaking among adolescents and young adults, and then again 
among the oldest-old (often described as those aged 80 and over).103 The distribution may be partly 
explained by the unrealistic relationship expectations of adolescents and young adults, and then 
late-life generally being characterised by the loss of partners and friends, as well as lower income 
levels and higher functional limitations.104 A recent review of several studies found that 40 to 50 
percent of people aged 80 and over reported that they “often” felt lonely (which is defined as 
moderate or serious loneliness); this compares to 20 to 30 percent of their younger counterparts 
aged 45 to 79.105 The National Seniors Council of Canada also reports that approximately 50 
percent of people over age 80 report feeling lonely.106 Loneliness is felt by older adults with intact 
and reduced cognitive function, although a Swedish study found a higher frequency among people 
                                                 
99 John T. Cacioppo et al, “Lonely traits and concomitant physiological processes: the MacArthur social 
neuroscience studies” (2000) 35 Intl J Psychophysiology 143 at 144; J Cacioppo, S Cacioppo & Boomsma, ibid at 6. 
100 S Cacioppo et al, supra note 75 at 239; Weiss, supra note 75 at 71-72. 
101 Maike Luhmann & Lousie C. Hawkley, “Age Differences in Loneliness From Late Adolescence to Oldest Old 
Age” (2016) Developmental Psychology doi: 10.1037/dev0000117; Pearl A. Dykstra, “Older adult loneliness: myths 
and realities” (2009) 6 Eur J Ageing 91 at 92-93 (respondents of all ages overestimated the rate of loneliness among 
the older population). 
102 Jude Cassidy & Steven R. Asher, “Loneliness and Peer Relations in Young Children” (1992) 63:2 Child 
Development 350. 
103 Karen Christensen & David Levinson, eds, Encyclopedia of Community: From the Village to the Virtual World, 
vol 1 (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., 2003) at 874; Leehu Zysberg, “Loneliness and Emotional 
Intelligence” in Ami Rokach, ed, Loneliness Updated: Recent research on loneliness and how it affects our lives 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 39 at 39; Hawkley & J Cacioppo, “Loneliness Matters” supra note 1 at 218. But see 
Reuven P. Bulka, “Loneliness: Causes, Consequences, and Cure” (1996) 20 Legal Med Q 9 (“People in their late 
60s, 70s, and 80s are invariably less lonely than younger adults” at 10 [emphasis added]).  
104 See Randy M. Page & Galen E. Cole, “Demographics Predictors of Self-Reported Loneliness in Adults” (1991) 
68 Psychol Reports 939 at 944; Jiska Cohen-Mansfield & Aleksandra Parpura-Gill, “Loneliness in older persons: a 
theoretical model and empirical findings” (2007) 19:2 Intl Psychogeriatrics 279 at 280; Luhmann & Hawkley, supra 
note 101. 
105 Dykstra, supra note 101 at 92. See also Jen Beaumont, “Measuring National Well-being – Older people and 
loneliness, 2013” (11 April 2013) Office of National Statistics, online: <www.ons.gov.uk> (2009/10 English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing showed that 34 percent of respondents aged 52 and over, and 46 percent of those aged 
80 and over, felt lonely “some of the time” or “often,” at 1). 
106 National Seniors Council, supra note 76 at 8. 
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aged 75 and older who had slight cognitive difficulties: 48 percent of subjects with slight cognitive 
reduction experienced loneliness, compared to 34 percent of subjects with strongly reduced 
function and 31 percent with intact function.107  
 Gender is a potential risk factor for loneliness, although studies on gender differences have 
produced inconsistent results.108 A recent study of older adults in Canada found that men were 
lonelier than woman.109 Men who are unmarried or have lost a spouse may be at an even greater 
risk of loneliness.110 If a spouse was their confidant, losing them may cause widowers to feel 
extremely lonely.111 In studies which have found women to be lonelier, observers have pointed out 
that men may be less likely to admit (i.e., self-report) feeling lonely.112 The stigma associated with 
loneliness may also make it susceptible to underreporting, especially by men.113  
 Living alone is also a risk factor associated with loneliness.114 Canadian census data from 
2011 shows that the prevalence of living alone increases in later life. Among men aged 65 and 
over, 16 percent lived alone; this number rose to 21.8 percent among men aged 85 and older.115 
For women, the numbers were 31.5 and 36.6 percent, respectively.116 The link between loneliness 
and living alone might be strongest among older adults from more “collectivist” societies, such as 
                                                 
107 Karin Holmén et al, “Loneliness among elderly people living in Stockholm: a population study” (1992) 17 J Adv 
Nursing 43 at 46-47 (it is hard to judge the results of people with strong cognitive reduction because they may have 
difficulty communicating their subjective experience of loneliness, at 52). See also Lisa Boss, Duck-Hee Kang & 
Sandy Branson, “Loneliness and cognitive function in the older adult: a systematic review” (April 2015) 27:4 Intl 
Psychogeriatrics 541 (greater loneliness is associated with lower cognitive function). 
108 Louise C. Hawkley et al, “The Mental Representations of Social Connections: Generalizability Extended to 
Beijing Adults” (2012) 7:9 PLOS One doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044065 at 9; Jiong Yang, Relationship between 
Gender Traits and Loneliness: The Role of Self-Esteem (MA Thesis, Brandeis University, Psychology Department, 
2009) [unpublished] at 3-5 & 21. 
109 Jenny de Jong Gierveld, Norah Keating & Janet E. Fast, “Determinants of Loneliness among Older Adults in 
Canada” (June 2015) 34:2 Can J Aging 125 at 133.  
110 Letitia Anne Peplau et al, “Being Old and Living Alone” in Peplau & Perlman, supra note 75, 327 at 339; 
Mannin, supra note 94 at 135; Lars Andersson, “Loneliness research and interventions: a review of the literature” 
(1998) 2:4 Aging & Mental Health 264 at 267. 
111 Kosberg, supra note 2 at 13. 
112 Andersson, supra note 110 at 267. 
113 Ibid. See also Anthea Tinker, Older People in Modern Society (New York: Addison Wesley, 1997) at 232; Myer 
D. Mendelson, “Reflections on Loneliness” (1990) 26:2 Contemporary Psychoanalysis 330; Mannin, supra note 94 
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(Boston: Beacon Press, 2010) at c 1. 
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115 Statistics Canada, Census in Brief, Living arrangements of seniors (2011), online: 
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Italy, where very high expectations of relationships may not be fulfilled.117 In comparison, older 
adults from “individualist” societies may view living alone as an achievement, rather than as a sign 
of rejection.118 A recent cross-national analysis found that older adults in Canada had the lowest 
loneliness scores when compared to their counterparts in seven other countries (France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Russia, Bulgaria, Georgia and Japan).119 
 Further, loneliness levels tend to be higher among older adults in poor health.120 Some 
specific ailments associated with loneliness are urinary incontinence,121 rheumatic diseases (e.g., 
osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia),122 and Charles Bonnet syndrome (complex visual hallucinations in 
the visually impaired).123 Older adults with these and other similar conditions may avoid or 
minimise social interaction to protect themselves against perceived stigma and embarrassment. 
 Certain personality characteristics may also increase one’s risk for loneliness. Low self-
esteem, shyness, social phobia, continuous apprehension and fear of embarrassment in public have 
been linked to loneliness.124 There is also a strong relationship between loneliness and anxiety.125 
                                                 
117 Fokkema, de Jong Gierveld & Dykstra, supra note 114 at 220; Laura Alejandra Rico-Uribe et al, “Loneliness, 
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unwillingness to consider information related to long-term care was informed by a cultural overlay, not mental 
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longer possible).  
118 Letitia Anne Peplau et al, “Being Old and Living Alone” in Peplau & Perlman, supra note 75, 327 at 329. But 
these assertions are generally speculative, as existing research rarely distinguishes between people for whom living 
alone is an established pattern and those for whom it is a result of a recent traumatic life event such as losing a 
spouse: Christina Victor, Sasha Scambler & John Bond, The Social World of Older People: Understanding 
Loneliness and Social Isolation in Later Life (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2009) at 27. Compare Philip Elliot 
Slater, The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970) at 11-12 
(one might expect higher loneliness levels in Anglo-American societies, given their individualistic dimensions). 
119 de Jong Gierveld, Keating & Fast, supra note 109 at 133. 
120 Ibid at 127; Elin Taube et al, “Being in a Bubble: the experience of loneliness among frail older people” (March 
2016) 72:3 J Adv Nursing 631 at 632-33. 
121 Pamela L. Ramage-Morin & Heather Gilmour, “Urinary incontinence and loneliness in Canadian seniors” 
Statistics Canada (October 2013), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca> at 5. 
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Similar to people with stigmatised health conditions, socially anxious people may withdraw from 
interaction as a defence mechanism, and unwittingly perpetuate the cycle of loneliness.126 
 
4. Negative associations 
Loneliness is linked to serious personal, societal and financial costs. First, it may have long-lasting 
negative effects on mental and physical health.127 Although the causal relationship is not clear-
cut,128 loneliness has been associated with heart disease and stroke;129 depression, suicide and 
alcoholism;130 accelerated cognitive decline, Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias;131 
decreased food intake;132 obesity and diabetes;133 and increased mortality.134 As life expectancies 
increase, these consequences are taking on greater significance. That is, while the short-term 
benefits of loneliness (e.g., increased motivation to reconnect) are realised across the lifespan, the 
cognitive and physiological effects (e.g., dementia, hypertension) are incurred in later life.135 
Throughout much of human history, people simply did not live long enough for the negative health 
effects of loneliness to be of much consequence.136 
                                                 
126 Duck, Pond & Leatham, supra note 5 at 255. 
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analysis of longitudinal observational studies” (18 April 2016) Heart doi:10.1136/heartjnl-2015-308790 at 1. But see 
Briana Mezuk et al, “Loneliness, Depression, and Inflammation: Evidence from the Multi-Ethnic Study of 
Atherosclerosis” (2016) 11:7 PLoS ONE doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158056 (loneliness is not positively associated 
with fibrinogen or C-reactive protein among relatively healthy middle-aged adults). 
130 Ken J. Rotenberg, “Loneliness and Interpersonal Trust” (1994) 13:2 J Soc & Clinical Psychol 152 at 152; 
Laurence C. Nolan, “Dimensions of Aging and Belonging for the Older Person and the Effects of Ageism” (2011) 
25 BYU J Pub L 317 at 322-23; Pikhartova, Bowling & Victor, supra note 78 at 106. 
131 Pikhartova, Bowling & Victor, ibid; Tjalling Jan Holwerda et al, “Feelings of loneliness, but not social isolation, 
predict dementia onset: results from the Amsterdam Study of the Elderly (AMSTEL)” (2014) 85 J Neurol Neurosurg 
Psychiatry 135. Compare Ellen Kathryn Rozek, The Effect of Loneliness on Executive Functioning in Young and 
Older Adults (PhD Thesis, University of Kansas, Faculties of Psychology and Gerontology, 2013) [unpublished] 
(findings provide limited support for hypothesis that loneliness impairs executive function, at 54). 
132 Walker & Beauchene, supra note 91 at 568.     
133 Petitte et al, supra note 129 at 130; Nilsson, Lindstrom & Naden, supra note 85 at 94. 
134 Luo et al, supra note 85 at 907; JoAnn Grif Alspach, “Loneliness and Social Isolation: Risk Factors Long 
Overdue for Surveillance” (December 2013) 33:6 Crit Care Nurse 8 at 9-10; Max L. Stek et al, “Is Depression in 
Old Age Fatal Only When People Feel Lonely?” (January 2005) 162:1 The American J Psychiatry 178. 
135 J Cacioppo, S Cacioppo & Boomsma, supra note 1 at 6. 
136 Ibid.             
   
 
21 
 
 Loneliness may lead to early and increased service utilisation. Among older adults, the 
emotional malady has been linked to early institutionalisation.137 Studies also show that lonely 
older people visit their doctor more often than the non-lonely.138 This pattern is said to reflect 
lonely people’s “tendency to substitute physician support for social support.”139 Lonely individuals 
also make more frequent trips to the emergency department.140 These self-coping mechanisms are 
understandable, and costly. British researchers estimate that increased service usage by chronically 
lonely older adults costs the public sector an average of £12,000 ($23,300 CAD) per person over 
15 years.141 For a local authority with 5,000 lonely older people, the total estimated cost over a 15-
year period is £60m ($116.5M CAD).142 
 Loneliness is also associated with maladaptive social cognition. According to an 
evolutionary model, loneliness makes people feel unsafe and this triggers an automatic 
hypervigilance for social threats.143 This “unconscious surveillance” produces cognitive biases; in 
particular, compared to non-lonely people, lonely individuals are more likely to expect rejection 
from others and remember negative social information.144 This maladaptive social cognition leads 
to lonely people behaving in self-protective ways, in which they push people away, despite 
                                                 
137 Morley D. Glicken, Evidence-Based Counseling and Psychotherapy for an Aging Population (Burlington, MA: 
Academic Press, 2009) at 164. 
138 Kerstin Gerst-Emerson & Jayani Jayawardhana, “Loneliness as a Public Health Issue: The Impact of Loneliness 
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simultaneously desiring that social contact.145 This behaviour tends to elicit negative responses 
from others, which validates the lonely person’s pessimistic expectations and fuels the likelihood 
of them again distancing themselves from potential social partners.146 John Cacioppo and Louise 
Hawkley illustrate this self-reinforcing loneliness loop as follows:  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The effects of loneliness on human cognition.147 Reprinted with permission.  
 
 
                                                 
145 Hawkley & J Cacioppo, “Loneliness Matters”, ibid; J Cacioppo, S Cacioppo & Boomsma, supra note 1 at 9 (does 
not distinguish between pushing away casual acquaintances [e.g. friends and family] versus formal supports [e.g. 
social workers or volunteer befrienders]). See also J Cacioppo & Patrick, supra note 80 (“The sad irony is that these 
poorly regulated behaviors, prompted by fearful sensations, often elicit the very rejections that we all dread the 
most” at 16). 
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(2009) University of Chicago, online: 
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Given that people who are stuck in the vicious cycle of loneliness tend to reject opportunities for 
social contact, it is unsurprising that popular interventions which encourage activities such as 
volunteering have little effectiveness. These initiatives do not directly target the negative feedback 
loop. It takes cognitive behavioural-based approaches to modify a chronically lonely person’s 
maladaptive social cognition, and release them from the perpetual downward cascade. CBT 
achieves this change by helping individuals identify and challenge their automatic negative 
thoughts, beliefs and behaviours (e.g., expecting rejection from others).148   
                                                 
148 S Cacioppo et al, supra note 75 at 239 at 244; Ken Laidlaw & Larry W. Thompson, “Cognitive behaviour 
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Psychological Treatments Work with Older Adults (Washington: American Psychological Association, 2012), 3 at 
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CHAPTER III: OLDER MEN – A FORGOTTEN POPULATION 
 
This chapter sets out my rationale for focusing on older men. Or to put it more transparently, I 
explain why I am not following the current trend of framing aging as a women’s issue.149 By 
writing about older men, I am not claiming that their challenges are bigger or more important than 
those faced by older women; rather, I am responding to their invisible suffering. For instance, 
Canadian men aged 85 and over have had the highest suicide rate of any age group in the 
country,150 yet this epidemic has attracted little widespread concern. They were only recently 
surpassed by men in their 50s, not because older men’s suicide rate has significantly dropped, but 
because the rate among middle-aged men’s has risen.151  
 This chapter is divided into two sections. First, I discuss the initial terminology issues 
which often pose a conundrum in law and aging literature: who is an older adult? And what terms 
should be used when referring to this heterogeneous group? For brevity purposes, I only address 
the questions briefly; my conciseness is not meant to undermine the importance of finding and 
using non-ageist language. Second, I identity the four factors which have compelled me to write 
about older men. The points can be summarised as the feminisation of elder advocacy; men’s less 
help-seeking behaviour; the family-oriented approach to law and policy; and the marginalising 
effects of the active aging approach.  
 
1. Who is an older adult?    
Older people (and older men) are more different than they are alike. People have intersectional 
identities which shape their experiences—age is just one component. Therefore, it is difficult to 
settle on the appropriate terminology to use when discussing this diverse group. Such efforts are 
often controversial. In this thesis, I interchangeably use the terms “older person,” “older adult,” 
and “elder” to refer to all older people in a general sense. I understand that some individuals have 
                                                 
149 See e.g. A.K. Dayton, “A Feminist Approach to Elder Law” in Doron, Theories, supra note 11 (“One important 
truth about global aging is that it is a ‘women’s issue’” at 45); Alzheimer Society of Canada’s, Media Release, 
“Alzheimer Awareness Month targets women with ‘The 72%’ campaign” (January 2015), online: 
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expressed discomfort with “elder” because of its close ties to “elderly,” which conjures 
stereotypical images of older people as frail, weak and dependent. However, as I discuss below in 
relation to my critique of the active aging approach, I fear that the modern battle cry to age 
“successfully” has further marginalised older people who are in fact frail, weak and dependent. I 
also use “elder” because of its respectful undertones, although I am sensitive to the fact that 
Aboriginal and faith communities may have criteria other than age which contribute to recognition 
as an Elder. At times, I also use the term “senior,” which has largely fallen out of fashion in 
academic writing. I use the word mostly when referring to various government initiatives, which 
continue to frequently describe members of the older population as “seniors.”  
 My discussion of older people is not confined to a specific age bracket. I am loosely 
referring to individuals in later life, generally those aged 80 and above. That said, people with 
undue hardships in life (e.g., homelessness, addictions, severe mental health issues, incarceration) 
may be physically older than their chronological age. “Old age” in these populations may start 
among those who are in their late 40s or early 50s. My focus on chronologically older people is 
for convenience and managing scope; younger vulnerable adults are not excluded on any 
principled basis. Moreover, I place little importance on age 65, which is the arbitrary number often 
associated with becoming a “senior.” I appreciate that age 65 (or sometimes 60, etc.) still carries 
some legal and practical relevance, as it continues to be the eligibility age for some programs and 
benefits (e.g., Old Age Security); however, for the purposes of this thesis, such defined ages 
amount to little more than convenient chronological markers.  
 
2. Why older men?   
Four factors have compelled me to focus on older men. First, older men have largely been 
forgotten.152 There are several possible explanations for this lack of attention, including the 
feminisation of elder advocacy:  
                                                 
152 Kosberg, supra note 2 at 15; Brian Beach & Sally-Marie Bamford, “Isolation: The emerging crisis for older men” 
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Whereas older women have taken advantage of the successful advocacy efforts of 
feminists, older men have not benefited from efforts of those in the men’s 
movement and there are few, if any, groups or organizations that advocate on behalf 
of their welfare. There are (faulty) assumptions regarding the superior quality of 
older men’s lives, compared to older women.153  
 
To be sure, feminist advocacy has corrected the historic invisibility of women in classic liberal 
legal analysis (in which the legal actor is male). Parts of my theoretical framework are indebted to 
feminist scholarship.154 However, older men, like women of all ages, are generally not reflected in 
the neutral liberal actor, who is male, but not old.155 Some might argue that “older adult” is a 
euphemism for “older man,” just as the “reasonable person” in law is really just the “reasonable 
man.” According to this line of thought, there would need to be concerted attention on older women 
because any discussion of “older adult” is actually characterised by implicit male norms. This 
argument may carry some weight, but on a whole, it is problematic. If the liberal individualist actor 
does not grow old, some men (e.g., white, heterosexual, able-bodied) will age into the unfamiliar 
position of “other.”156 Women are “others” throughout their lives; older men may be experiencing 
marginalisation for the first time. Physical changes may also catch men off guard, or be met with 
resistance or denial. It is arguable that many women have a lifetime of bodily changes that are 
largely outside of their control (e.g., menstruation, child birth, lactation).157 Aging can be seen as 
a continuation of those experiences. For older men, the loss of bodily control may be new (e.g., 
age-related incontinence, impotence).158 From this perspective, it is possible that men may be less 
psychologically prepared for or accepting of the transition into old age. 
 The women-centred lens in elder advocacy has failed to respond to the particular needs and 
challenges of older men. For instance, the proliferation of rudimentary financial elder abuse 
prevention programs held in community centres and church basements do not effectively reach 
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Jamieson, Sarah Harper & Christina R. Victor, eds, Critical Approaches to Ageing and Later Life (Philadelphia: 
Open University Press, 1997), 160 at 169, referenced in Hall, “Old Age”, supra note 155 at 8-9. 
157 Harper, ibid at 166. 
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many older men, yet studies show that they are often victims. In a recent examination of the Ottawa 
Police Service’s elder abuse files, researchers found that the most common type of elder abuse was 
financial, and that men were victimized more often than women.159 Research on securities fraud 
also reveals that among older adults, the main victims are men, especially financially-literate, 
college-educated, married older men with self-reliant and self-deterministic personalities.160 Such 
individuals do not fit the typical profile of “financial elder abuse 101” attendees. As Jayne Barnard 
astutely observes, “the type of person who is most likely to make an irrational investment 
decision—a stubborn, self-reliant, risk-seeking seventy-five-year-old man—is precisely the type 
of person least likely to seek out or internalize cautionary educational messages.”161  
 As funders shift dollars to loneliness and isolation interventions, the trend of women-
oriented programming has continued. Many initiatives have been designed without older men in 
mind, and unsurprisingly, we see very low participation rates among this cohort, especially among 
older men who are widowed, unmarried or otherwise unattached. For instance, in the 2014-2015 
Ontario-based pilot project, “Living Life to the Full for Older Adults,” older women accounted for 
89 percent of participants, and of the handful of men who did attend, some were spouses of the 
women attendees.162 Low attendance among older men can be partly explained by demographics; 
since women on average live longer, there are simply more older women than older men.163 But 
statistics are only part of the story. Another explanation for low turnout among older men is that 
some of them may eschew traditionally-run organisations aimed at older people, in part because 
they are not male-friendly.164 Some researchers suggest that programs and clubs geared toward 
older adults might attract more men by having amenities such as a pool table and beer.165 Changing 
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<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/rr13_1/rr13_1.pdf> at 9. 
160 Jayne W. Barnard, “Deception, Decisions and Investor Education” (2009) 17 Elder LJ 201 at 210. 
161 Ibid at 231. 
162 Jenny Hardy & Nasreen Khatri, “Living Life to the Full: Breaking the Ice(olation) of Aging” (Presentation 
delivered at the Annual NICE Knowledge Exchange, Toronto, May 28, 2015). 
163 In Canada, the average life expectancy is 84 years for females and 80 for males: World Health Organization, 
Countries, “Canada”, online: <http://www.who.int/countries/can/en/> (for people born in 2013). Among the 
Canadian population in 2010, women accounted for 56 percent of people aged 65 and older, 67 percent of those 
aged 85 and older, and 80 percent of centenarians. However, as the gender gap in life expectancies narrows between 
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population” Statistics Canada (July 2011), online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-503-
x/2010001/article/11475-eng.pdf> at 8. 
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the location might also help. Instead of community centres and church basements, programming 
could take place at other trusted venues such as the Legion, golf club or barbershop.166 Such an 
approach has been applied to prostate cancer education efforts in the U.S., where African-
American barbershops disseminate customized information to patrons.167 In terms of loneliness 
and isolation initiatives, very few programs specifically target older men. There are only a handful 
of exceptions. For instance, Men’s Sheds are a promising example of “male-friendly” 
programming. Described as the modern version of “the shed in the backyard,” Men’s Sheds give 
men a safe and busy environment where they can find a sense of community and connection to 
friends “in an atmosphere of old-fashioned mateship.”168 In the “sheds,” men might be found 
restoring furniture, fixing bicycles, making bird feeders or learning to cook for themselves. Others 
might just come for a cup of coffee. The program started in Australia, expanded to the U.K. and 
now has some traction in Canada.169 But as with the vast majority of loneliness strategies, it 
assumes a consenting participant. 
 This brings me to the second factor justifying my focus on older men: men have a general 
tendency to be less help-seeking, making them a difficult group to find and engage. In particular, 
when compared to women, men are less likely to admit to having life problems, to seek help for 
those issues and, if they do reach out, they are less likely to actively participate or remain in 
programs.170 Absent an emergency, older men without concerned children or close friends may 
have very little contact with service providers. A recent study of a U.K. home-visiting befriending 
service found that initial contact with the program was made on behalf of the older person, not 
through self-referral, and most often the contact was made by a female relative or friend.171 
 Third, I am focusing on older men because many laws, policies and awareness campaigns 
in relation to elders (e.g., advance care planning) place considerable significance on the notion of 
                                                 
166 Changing the location might also improve uptake generally, not just among men: see e.g. Cohen-Mansfield & 
Parpura-Gill, supra note 104 (less than 20 percent of older Americans participate in senior centre activities, at 289). 
167 See generally John S. Luque et al, “Barbershop Communications on Prostate Cancer Screening Using Barber 
Health Advisors” (2011) 5:2 Am J of Men’s Health 129. 
168 Australian Men’s Shed Association, “Home”, online: <http://www.mensshed.org>. 
169 See e.g. Okanagan Men’s Shed, “About”, online: <http://mensshed.ca/>. 
170 Kosberg, supra note 2 at 18-19; Addis & Mahalik, supra note 2; Vacha-Haase, Wester & Christianson, supra 
note 2 at 35-36. 
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family.172 This emphasis may result in approaches which are unresponsive to the needs and 
challenges of those without family or other social networks—an outcome which may 
disproportionately affect men, since they tend to have smaller support networks than women.173 
The consequences may be particularly acute among the oldest-old, as late life is a period generally 
characterised by fading social networks and sometimes the loss of a life-long spouse.174 To be sure, 
at least one government has partly responded to the recognition that some individuals do not have 
(trusted) family members. In recent years, B.C. amended its Health Care (Consent) and Care 
Facility (Admission) Act to include “close friends” as potential temporary substitute decision-
makers for health care.175 The Act defines a close friend as an “adult who has a long-term, close 
personal relationship involving frequent personal contact with the [patient], but does not include a 
person who receives compensation for providing personal care or health care to [the patient].”176 
For individuals without friends or family, the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) is available, but 
it becomes involved if there is concern that the person is incapable.177 Vulnerable adults who do 
not lack capacity are excluded from the ambit of the PGT’s protective powers.178  
 When there is an external predator (i.e., a third party), the doctrines of undue influence and 
unconscionability may help bridge this protective gap which leaves out vulnerable adults who do 
not lack capacity.179 For example, in Juzumas v Baron, Lang J.A. (ad hoc) of the Ontario Superior 
Court found that a 65-year-old housekeeper had exercised undue influence over Mr. Juzumas, a 
“vulnerable and completely dependent” 89-year-old man whom she “dominated.”180 The 
                                                 
172 See Adam P. Romero, “Living alone: New demographic research” in Martha Albertson Fineman, ed, 
Transcending the Boundaries of Law: Generations of feminism and legal theory (New York: Routledge, 2011), 258 
at 258 & 269-72.  
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175 RSBC 1996, c 181, s 16(1) [BC HCCCFA Act]. See also Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 1 (“near 
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177 See Public Guardian and Trustee Act, RSBC 1996, c 383, ss 17(1)(b) & (c) [BC PGT Act]; Public Guardian and 
Trustee of British Columbia, Services to Adults, “Assessment and Investigation Services”, online: 
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Conference on Elder Law, 29 October 2010) [unpublished] (“clients often appear annoyed that state actors like the 
Public Guardian and Trustee or the police don’t more vigorously protect older adults who are vulnerable to 
exploitation and neglect” at 5-6). 
179 See Hall, “Equity”, supra note 11 at 110-15. 
180 2012 ONSC 7220, [2012] OJ No 6159 at paras 1-2 & 50 [Juzumas]. But see Ross-Scott v Potvin, 2014 BCSC 
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housekeeper persistently threatened that she would abandon him to a nursing home; fearing this 
outcome, Mr. Juzumas married her and transferred her his house.181 Mr. Juzumas did not present 
with dementia, although he was “at times muddled, confused, despondent [and] disoriented.”182 In 
granting a divorce and setting aside the transfer, Lang J.A. described Mr. Juzumas as “an elderly 
person who was both psychologically and physically vulnerable.”183 Lang J.A. concluded that the 
transfer was tainted by unconscionability, as well as “undue influence of a vulnerable elder.”184 
 But in the absence of a third party, we are again left with a protective gap when the 
influential factor is internal but does not render the person incapable. Under our traditional 
approach, constraints such as loneliness are legally irrelevant, yet loneliness, which has been 
described as a “hidden fox gnawing at the vitals,”185 is associated with maladaptive social 
cognition which may heighten one’s propensity to reject objectively needed support, despite 
simultaneously desiring it. In appropriate cases, this emotional predator should matter in law. 
Using a superior court’s protective jurisdiction not only fills this protective gap, but it also has the 
potential to flexibly respond to situations in which a lonely older man has no family or close 
friends. Notably, the B.C. Court of Appeal has found that anyone can ask a superior court to invoke 
its parens patriae jurisdiction.186 
 Fourth, I am writing about older men because they face the stereotypical image of 
masculinity in which they are expected to behave independently,187 and the internalisation of this 
expectation may contribute to their resistance to care. In recent years, the stereotype has been 
intensified by the active aging approach, which tells older men (and women) that independence is 
a key to so-called “successful aging.”188 The active aging narrative emphasizes the importance of 
leading an active, participatory and productive lifestyle in old age (e.g., we should all strive to be 
a tracksuit-wearing 90-year-old marathon runner). Unfortunately, the active aging approach drives 
                                                 
which a lonely, non-social 77 year old man wished to form a union with the [56-year-old] defendant and to remain 
in his home until he died” at para 284). 
181 Juzumas, ibid at paras 1-2. 
182 Ibid at para 70.      
183 Ibid at para 12.      
184 Ibid at paras 2 & 105.       
185 Mannin, supra note 94 at 11.  
186 L.S. and S.S. v British Columbia (Ministry of Children and Family Development), 2004 BCCA 244, 238 DLR 
(4th) 655 at para 51 (including strangers). 
187 See e.g. James A. Smith et al, “‘I’ve been independent for so damn long!’: Independence, masculinity and aging 
in a help seeking context” (2007) 21 J Aging Studies 325 at 325. 
188 For a critique of the active aging approach, see e.g. Martha B. Holstein & Meredith Minkler, “Self, Society, and 
the ‘New Gerontology’” (2003) 43:6 The Gerontologist 787 at 792. 
   
 
31 
 
many modern-day policy agendas, with the federal government recently boasting: “A large 
majority of seniors are … active later in life: 80 percent of seniors participate frequently (at least 
monthly) in at least one social activity, 36 percent perform volunteer work and 13 percent 
participate in the work force.”189 The B.C. Seniors Advocate also has a tendency to reinforce the 
active aging message. For instance, on National Seniors Day 2015, the Advocate wrote: 
Today I urge you to celebrate the courage of seniors. The 80-year-old woman with 
severe arthritis who braves driving rain, but still walks several kilometres to and 
from the grocery story to get supplies for dinner. The father who decides to become 
a university student for the first time at 70. The widowed grandparent who steps up 
to parent a grandchild after raising five kids of her own. 
 
Today is a day to celebrate the selflessness of seniors. In virtually every sector of 
society it’s easy to see this in action. Individual seniors want to help in the diverse 
communities they live in. According to StatsCan, Canadians 65 and over, volunteer 
on average 220 hours per year, higher than any age group.190  
 
This statement further marginalises the homebound older man slouched in a worn chair drinking 
a can of beer, eating a TV dinner and watching Wheel of Fortune. The effects of diabetes make 
him unable to shuffle to the grocery store; deteriorating vision makes it difficult to read; he cannot 
“step up” to care for his grandchildren, because he has none; he stopped going to church years ago; 
and after decades of working long hours at a manufacturing plant, he does not have the will or 
energy to volunteer. From an active aging perspective, he is aging “unsuccessfully.” He has 
“failed” because he is not youthful, healthy and independent. He is old, sick and dependent. 
Unsurprisingly, the societal expectations associated with the active aging approach (i.e., staying 
youthful and independent) may contribute to a frail lonely older person’s feeling of loneliness.191 
 “Unsuccessfulness” is not unique. For example, 50 percent of older people in the U.K. 
consider the television to be their main form of company,192 and in Canada, fewer than two percent 
of post-secondary students are over age 60.193 Volunteering rates also drop off among older 
cohorts. Less than one third of Canadians aged 75 and over volunteer, the lowest among all age 
                                                 
189 Government of Canada, Action for Seniors Report (2014), online: 
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193 Meghan Dale, Trends in the Age Composition of College and University Students and Graduates, Statistics 
Canada, online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/81-004-x/2010005/article/11386-eng.htm> at Charts 1 & 2. 
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groups.194 It is also arguable that active aging benchmarks such as volunteering implicitly reflect 
privileged-class norms: individuals with less education and lower incomes are less likely to 
volunteer than those with higher education and incomes.195 Further, the idea of volunteering may 
not resonate with everyone, including some older men. As the U.K. Men’s Sheds Association chair 
candidly observes, “If you want a man to do something, don’t ask him to volunteer, tell him there 
is a problem and it needs fixing.”196 The active aging message can also lead people to believe that 
everyone except them is aging “successfully.” But again, the numbers suggest otherwise. Take 
running as an example. In the 2015 Boston Marathon, only 11 out of 27,167 starters were in the 
80+ age group.197 As Ethel Mannin similarly observed in 1966, “air-borne centenarians prove 
nothing except that some people wear better than others.”198  
 My critique of the active aging approach is not an endorsement of disengagement theory. 
According to this highly-criticised perspective,199 social withdrawal is a voluntary, universal and 
natural part of aging.200 It has recently been suggested that older men’s internalisation of 
disengagement theory might explain why their psychological suffering remains undetected and 
untreated, in part because they “mistakenly blame symptoms on the aging process.”201 I do not 
suggest that we harken back to the days when disengagement theory dominated, but it is my view 
that the active aging approach has set many older men up for “failure” because its standards are 
unattainable. The consequences of framing age-related decline as a failure are not just symbolic. 
Research suggests that men may be more likely to reach out for help if their problem is considered 
“normal;”202 but the active aging approach does not normalise problems men may experience in 
old age. It stigmatises them. If they recoil, it becomes even harder to find and engage them.   
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CHAPTER IV: EVOLUTION OF THE PARENS PATRIAE JURISDICTION 
 
This chapter sets out the recent evolution of the parens patriae jurisdiction in Canada, in which 
some courts have departed from the strict understanding that the jurisdiction can only be exercised 
when they make a formal finding of incapacity. I begin with a general discussion of “first 
generation” parens patriae in Canada. I then explore the terminological confusion surrounding the 
concept of inherent jurisdiction. I argue that inherent jurisdiction is something more than a source 
of procedural powers; that is, it can be invoked to affect substantive matters. Next, I discuss the 
emergence of the English High Court’s protective jurisdiction, which has been extended to 
vulnerable adults who do not lack capacity. I conclude the chapter with an overview of some 
Canadian cases which have laid the groundwork for what I refer to as “second generation” parens 
patriae, or the superior courts’ protective jurisdiction over vulnerable adults.   
 
1. First generation parens patriae in Canada 
The parens patriae jurisdiction has traditionally allowed superior courts to protect children and 
mentally incompetent persons who are unable to look after themselves.203 The courts’ authority is 
derived from the Crown’s power and duty to protect as parens patriae (a term derived from the 
English concept of the King’s role as a father of the country).204 The Crown does not exercise this 
protective role directly; it has been delegated to the superior courts.205 The jurisdiction is founded 
on necessity, namely “that the law should place somewhere the care of individuals who cannot 
take care of themselves, particularly in cases where it is clear that some care should be thrown 
                                                 
203 E. (Mrs.) v Eve, [1986] 2 SCR 388, 1986 CanLII 36 at para 35 [Eve] (non-therapeutic sterilisation of a mentally 
incompetent young adult woman not authorised under the parens patriae jurisdiction); Seaman (Re) (1997), 151 
DLR (4th) 337, [1998] 1 WWR 353 paras 15-16 [Seaman]. For a detailed discussion of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction’s genesis, see Eve, ibid at paras 31-71. 
204 F v West Berkshire HA, [1990] 2 AC 1, [1991] UKHL 1 (sub nom In Re F) at 6 [F], aff’g [1990] 2 AC 1, [1989] 
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around them.”206 The Charter has not limited the jurisdiction;207 however, it cannot be invoked to 
abrogate a person’s Charter rights.208  
 It is a flexible and adaptable remedy with a theoretically unlimited scope, in that the courts 
have declined to strictly define the matters in which it can be exercised to protect a child or 
mentally incompetent person.209 For instance, it has been invoked in such matters as custody, 
protection of property, medical treatment, as well as questions of residence and contact.210 
Traditionally, there are three situations in which the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction may 
be justified: emergency situations in which a child or incompetent adult is considered to be in need 
of protection; judicial review of an exercise of statutory power; or when there is a legislative gap 
which results in the child’s or incompetent adult’s best interests not being met.211  
 The legislative gap approach was established by Wilson J. of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Beson v Newfoundland (Director of Child Welfare).212 In that case, the Director of Child Welfare 
removed a child from a prospective adoptive home because of child abuse allegations, which were 
ultimately unfounded.213 The potentially applicable legislation did not provide the adopting parents 
with a right of appeal.214 Writing for the Court, Wilson J. found a legislative gap which the lower 
court could have filled by exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction in a manner that it considered 
to be in the child’s best interests, which was that the child be returned to the adoptive home.215  
 The legislative gap approach has sometimes been incorrectly interpreted to mean that there 
must be an absence of legislation on the matter;216 but as La Forest J. of the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated in E. (Mrs.) v Eve, “even where there is legislation in the area, the courts will continue 
to use the parens patriae jurisdiction to deal with uncontemplated situations where it appears 
necessary to do so for the protection of those who fall within its ambit.”217 The jurisdiction “is a 
                                                 
206 Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827), 2 Russ 1 at 20, cited in Eve, supra note 203 at para 41. 
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carefully guarded one” and “[t]he courts will not readily assume that it has been removed by 
legislation where a necessity arises to protect a person who cannot protect himself.”218 Further, as the 
Alberta Surrogate Court stated in Seaman (Re), courts are bound to enforce the legislative will, but 
“they may also have a duty to exercise their inherent powers for the protection of children or 
mentally incompetent adults.”219 Similarly, in a 2012 Ontario Superior Court decision, Harper J. 
observed that while the traditional view has been that parens patriae can only be exercised if there 
is a legislative gap, some recent Ontario cases suggest that there may be other exceptional 
circumstances which justify use of the jurisdiction.220 For example, in Perino v Perino, a mentally 
disabled adult witness was in need of independent legal representation, but legal aid services did 
not extend to her situation.221 The matter did not affect the witness’s physical integrity; however, 
it was central to her well-being.222 Corbett J. invoked the Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction to 
order that the witness be provided state-funded legal services. He also exercised the Court’s 
inherent jurisdiction, which he said provided it with the jurisdiction to control its own process.223  
 
2. Inherent jurisdiction: terminological confusion 
In Perino, Corbett J. defined inherent jurisdiction as a procedural concept. However, such a limited 
description is controversial. There are cases in which inherent jurisdiction is also characterised as 
a substantive concept,224 and adding to the linguistic bewilderment, the parens patriae jurisdiction 
itself is referred to an inherent jurisdiction.225 Recognising the superior courts’ inherent jurisdiction 
as something more than a source of procedural powers is important for the approach I am proposing 
in this thesis because, as I discuss below, the English courts have ventured outside the parens 
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patriae doctrine and into the wider “jurisdictional hinterland”226 of inherent jurisdiction to justify 
intervening in the lives of vulnerable adults who do not lack capacity. Narrowly interpreting 
inherent jurisdiction as a procedural concept would significantly undermine, if not prohibit, such 
interventions, as they undoubtedly affect the adults’ substantive rights. 
 Canadian courts have described the superior courts’ inherent jurisdiction as having an 
“amorphous nature,” although it “does not operate without limits.”227 It is a special and 
extraordinary power which should “be exercised sparingly and with caution.”228 Government can 
remove the court’s inherent jurisdiction over a particular matter, but only by “clear and precise 
[statutory] language.”229 Thus, even if a matter is regulated by statute, a court can still exercise its 
inherent jurisdiction as long as doing so would not conflict with any legislative provision.230 The 
mere existence of legislation does not oust the court’s inherent jurisdiction; the jurisdiction remains 
as long as it is exercised in a manner which does not contravene the legislative will.  
 Given these loose descriptions, the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction has been characterised 
as vague and difficult to pin down.231 The modern starting point for the confusion is I.H. Jacob’s 
seminal and frequently cited article, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court.”232 Jacob stated that 
the jurisdiction is part of procedural law, not substantive law.233 He defined it as: 
the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may 
draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular 
to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or 
oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between 
them.234  
 
Jacob also differentiated between a court’s inherent and general jurisdictions. He stated that: 
 
the two terms are not interchangeable, for the “inherent” jurisdiction of the court is 
only a part or an aspect of its general jurisdiction. The general jurisdiction of the 
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High Court as a superior court of record is, broadly speaking, unrestricted and 
unlimited in all matters of substantive law, both civil and criminal, except in so far 
as that has been taken away in unequivocal terms by statutory enactment. The High 
Court is not subject to supervisory control by any other court except by due process 
of appeal, and it exercises the full plenitude of judicial power in all matters 
concerning the general administration of justice within its area. Its general 
jurisdiction thus includes the exercise of an inherent jurisdiction.235 
 
In the recent case of Reznik v Matty, the B.C. Supreme Court discussed the conceptual confusion 
between inherent and general jurisdictions.236 The petitioners, as residuary beneficiaries of an 
estate, sought an order directing the executor to immediately distribute some of the funds.237 Their 
counsel argued that the Court’s authority to make the order flowed from its inherent jurisdiction.238 
The respondent’s counsel disagreed, and argued that its inherent jurisdiction was limited to 
controlling its own process.239 Relying on Jacob’s article, Funt J. stated that “the phrase ‘inherent 
jurisdiction’ may have created confusion,” and that it did not have the same meaning as general 
jurisdiction.240 He concluded that “[i]n sum, the court is a court of general jurisdiction, with ‘all of 
the powers that are necessary to do justice between the parties.’”241 Appearing to rely on the 
Court’s general (not inherent) jurisdiction, Funt J. ordered the distribution.242 
 The ambiguity surrounding the scope of a superior court’s inherent jurisdiction is further 
complicated by the fact that appellate and inferior (statutory) courts, as well as administrative 
tribunals, also claim to invoke an inherent jurisdiction to control their own process.243 In these 
contexts, however, the jurisdiction is exclusively considered to be a procedural concept. Some 
judges have stated that it might be preferable and less confusing to describe an inferior court’s 
control over its own procedure as an implied jurisdiction, since inherent jurisdiction is used by 
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superior courts.244 Similarly, a tribunal’s procedural powers may be better described as implied or 
equitable,245 or as Member Groarke of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal suggested in relation 
to arbitrators, “I cannot help but feel that a term like ‘ancillary jurisdiction’ or ‘incidental 
jurisdiction’ would be more accurate and less provocative than the term ‘inherent jurisdiction.”246 
These observations suggest that the inherent jurisdiction of superior courts is something more than 
procedural; otherwise, it would not be confusing to also use it in relation to appellate and inferior 
courts’ control over their own process. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada has not helped 
clarify matters. In United States of America v Shulman, Arbour J., writing for the Court, stated that 
“[an appellate court] has, like all courts, an implied, if not inherent, jurisdiction to control its own 
process.”247 Using the word “inherent” is needlessly confusing because, as the Supreme Court of 
Canada itself has unequivocally stated, “there is no inherent jurisdiction in any appeal court.”248 
 Others have suggested that the problem rests less with the terms “inherent” and “implied,” 
and more so with the mistaken conflation of the words “jurisdiction” and “power.” The High Court 
of New Zealand made the following distinction between inherent jurisdiction and inherent power: 
The former connotes an original and universal jurisdiction not derived from any 
other sources, whereas the latter connotes an implied power such as the power to 
prevent abuse of process, which is necessary for the due administration of justice 
under powers already conferred. Thus the High Court has an inherent jurisdiction 
as confirmed by s16 of the Judicature Act 1908 whereas the District Court has an 
implied power within that jurisdiction as conferred by statute. It is not an inherent 
jurisdiction but a power which exists within that statutory jurisdiction.249 
 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Zealand has observed that “[s]ome confusion may arise 
because the term ‘inherent jurisdiction’ is applied both to substantive and procedural powers.”250 
It states that courts’ inherent powers to regulate their own process arise out of either statutory and 
common law substantive jurisdictions; “courts which do not possess an inherent substantive 
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jurisdiction (as is the case where their substantive powers are entirely statutory) nevertheless have 
inherent or implied procedural powers necessary to enable them to give effect to their statutory 
substantive jurisdiction.”251 From this perspective, Jacob’s description of inherent jurisdiction may 
be better captured by the phrase “inherent procedural powers” (as opposed to statutory procedural 
powers of appellate and inferior courts), in that they are incidental procedural devices which enable 
superior courts to control their own process.252 On this understanding, the inherent jurisdiction is 
simply a descriptor of where a superior court’s inherent procedural powers originate; the inherent 
jurisdiction (as opposed to statute) is the source of a superior court’s procedural devices.253  
 But this interpretation of inherent jurisdiction is narrow. Others describe the concept as 
something more than a source of procedural powers. For example, Goh Yihan argues that inherent 
jurisdiction refers to a superior court’s inherent authority to hear a matter,254 although this 
description closely resembles Jacob’s definition of general jurisdiction.255 Yihan identifies a few 
examples of the High Court of Singapore exercising its inherent authority, including Re LP (adult 
patient: medical treatment).256 In that case, a hospital brought an urgent application asking the 
Court to declare that a proposed amputation was in a patient’s best interests.257 Initially, the patient 
refused surgery and said she wanted her legs saved at all costs, but then her conditioned worsened 
and she went into a coma before doctors made it known to her that she would die if her legs were 
not amputated.258 Given the urgency of the situation, there was no time to appoint a substitute 
decision-maker.259 Since the patient was not “mentally disordered,” the mental health legislation 
did not apply and the Court seemed to implicitly decline to invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction.260 
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Instead, it relied upon its inherent jurisdiction to grant the order.261 The Court was concerned that 
if it failed to provide a solution to the problem, “the common law would be seriously defective.”262 
The Court emphasized that by finding that the amputation was in the patient’s best interests, it was 
not altering the underlying substantive law; it was merely providing a forum to adjudicate a 
problem that did not fall within statutory or parens patriae jurisdiction.263 The Supreme Court of 
Canada expressed a similar sentiment in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Canadian Liberty 
Net.264 Bastarache J., writing for the majority, stated that if a person has a justiciable right, there 
must be a court competent to enforce it: the purpose of the inherent “residual” or “remedial” 
jurisdiction “is simply to ensure that a right will not be without a superior court forum in which it 
can be recognized.”265 Further, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has stated that a superior court’s 
inherent jurisdiction “should not be used to effect changes in substantive law.”266 This passage was 
recently cited with approval by the B.C. Court of Appeal.267  
 But Yihan identifies cases in which the superior court (in Singapore) has exercised its 
inherent jurisdiction in matters which affect substantive matters.”268 For conceptual clarity, he 
states that in these cases, the court is invoking its “inherent substantive powers,” which are 
distinguishable from a court’s inherent jurisdiction and inherent procedural powers.269 Yihan 
acknowledges that the idea of inherent substantive powers may “be a startling one,” especially 
since the Singaporean Court of Appeal has stated that the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction can only 
be invoked for procedural matters.270 However, the suggestion aligns with a judge’s important 
(albeit controversial) role to develop and adapt the common law to meet the changing needs of 
society. As Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR stated in the Court of Appeal’s decision in F, “the 
common law is the great safety net which lies behind all statute law and is capable of filling gaps 
left by that law, if and in so far as those gaps have to be filled in the interests of society as a whole. 
This process of using the common law to fill gaps is one of the most important duties of the 
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judges.”271 And as Lord Griffiths of the House of Lords stated on further appeal, “judges can and 
should accept responsibility to recognize the need and to adapt the common law to meet [the public 
interest].”272 Doing so may even make new law; however, if such a development is not met with 
public approval, it is always be open to the government to reverse or alter it.273  
 
 
3. Protective jurisdiction: the English experience 
In England, the parens patriae jurisdiction as it relates to mentally incompetent adults is no longer 
available; instead, the courts now (controversially) use what has been described as an inherent 
“protective jurisdiction.” It has been suggested that the “inadvertent loss”274 of parens patriae lead 
to the “rediscovery”275 of the protective jurisdiction in F, 276 although even one of its biggest 
proponents (Munby J.) has more recently acknowledged that the jurisdiction was invented.277 The 
practical difference between the protective jurisdiction and the parens patriae jurisdiction has been 
described as “a distinction without a difference.”278 But substantively, the English courts have 
extended the scope of the protective jurisdiction to vulnerable adults who do not lack capacity. 
 
a. Inadvertent loss of parens patriae 
In F, the House of Lords considered whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to order the 
proposed sterilisation of F, a 36-year-old woman with a serious mental disability who lacked 
capacity to consent to the operation.279 From age 14, F had been a voluntary in-patient at a mental 
hospital.280 The sterilisation issue arose because of a sexual relationship she had developed with a 
male patient, and because of her mental disability, it was believed that it would be psychologically 
disastrous for her to conceive a child (other contraception methods such as the pill and an 
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intrauterine device had been ruled out).281 The High Court found that sterilisation would be in F’s 
best interests, and the Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed that conclusion.282 On further appeal, 
the House of Lords faced three issues: whether it was necessary or desirable for the High Court to 
have become involved in the matter; if so, what jurisdiction the High Court had to deal with the 
matter; and if the Court had jurisdiction, the procedure it should have used to exercise it.283  
 On the first question, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook found that the statutory vacuum made it 
necessary for the High Court to become involved. The mental capacity legislation did not apply to 
the proposed sterilisation because its provisions only governed treatment for a patient’s mental 
disorder (e.g., anti-psychotic medications), not treatment for conditions other than a mental 
disorder (e.g., sterilisation to prevent conception).284 Lord Brandon found that the common law 
filled the gap because, in his view, the existing common law allowed doctors to lawfully treat 
incapable adults without their consent if treatment was in the best interests of the patient.285 He 
found that treatment would only be in the best interests of incapable patients if it was carried out 
to save their lives, or to ensure or prevent deterioration of their physical or mental health.286 Since 
Lord Brandon viewed the existing law as already permitting the sterilisation (if it was in F’s best 
interests), he found that the doctors did not need court approval to carry out it out; doing so would 
make medical care for incapable persons “grind to a halt.”287 Nevertheless, given the serious, 
irreversible and controversial nature of the proposed sterilisation, he stated that it was “highly 
desirable” for the High Court to become involved “as a matter of good practice.”288  
 Lord Brandon then turned to the second question: the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal 
with the matter. He found that the parens patriae jurisdiction as it related to minors continued to 
survive in the form of the High Court’s wardship jurisdiction, but the parens patriae jurisdiction 
as it related to mentally incompetent adults had ceased to exist.289 The Court contrasted this 
situation with other jurisdictions, including Canada, where the parens patriae jurisdiction in 
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relation to incompetent adults was “still alive and available for exercise by their courts.”290 Lord 
Brandon explained that the parens patriae jurisdiction no longer existed in England because of 
two events which occurred in November 1960.291 First, the Mental Health Act 1959 came into 
force, and second, the instrument authorising the High Court’s jurisdiction over persons of 
unsound mind was revoked.292 Since the parens patriae jurisdiction was unavailable and the 
mental capacity legislation did not apply, Lord Brandon relied upon the common law, although in 
his view, it did not confer a jurisdiction to approve or disapprove the operation, but simply 
confirmed that the procedure was already lawful.293  
 On the third question, Lord Brandon stated that the High Court had the jurisdiction to make 
a declaration regarding the lawfulness of the proposed sterilisation.294 He found that this 
declaratory jurisdiction was part of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.295 He reiterated that by 
exercising its declaratory jurisdiction, the High Court would not be changing the substantive law, 
since again, it was his view that the existing common law in England allowed doctors to perform 
the surgery.296 According to Lord Brandon, the High Court’s declaration was not making the 
unlawful lawful; the proposed sterilisation, by operation of the common law, was already lawful. 
The High Court was simply providing a judicial “third opinion” that the proposed sterilisation was 
in F’s best interests and therefore lawful.297  
 Since F, the English courts have continued to justify using the protective jurisdiction on 
the grounds that it fills gaps in statutory law. Initially, the new jurisdiction was invoked in relation 
to mentally incompetent adults whose situations did not fall precisely within mental capacity 
legislation.298 The scope of the jurisdiction is broad, applying to surgery and matters unconnected 
to medical treatment.299 As Munby J. asserted, “the court can regulate everything that conduces to 
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the incompetent adult’s welfare and happiness.”300 One of the largest threats to the English courts’ 
continued use of the protective jurisdiction in relation to incompetent adults was the passage of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005), which came into force in 2007.301 However, several 
cases have confirmed that the jurisdiction survived the legislation’s implementation.302 Even more, 
in DL v A Local Authority & Ors, Davis LJ of the English Court of Appeal rejected the argument 
that the mental capacity legislation had completely ousted the High Court’s protective jurisdiction 
in relation to adults, whether incapacitated or not: “there simply is no such provision to that effect 
contained in the MCA 2005—which, as I read it, is concerned only with adults who lack capacity 
(as defined in the statute).”303 Thus as Munby J. observed in E v Channel Four & Anor, the English 
courts have “come a long way since the decision in [F].”304 They are not only invoking the 
protective jurisdiction in relation to incompetent adults, but also in relation to a wider category of 
individuals classified as “vulnerable adults” who do not lack capacity.305 Jackson J. of the English 
High Court recently confirmed this in unequivocal terms; he stated that “the jurisdiction has been 
developed to provide remedies for the protection of vulnerable but not legally incapable adults.”306  
 
b. Expansion to vulnerable adults 
This section chronologically outlines some of the seminal English cases in which the High Court 
has exercised its protective jurisdiction over vulnerable adults—a category which Munby J. first 
described in Re SA (Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage).307 In that case, he addressed 
whether the High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction to protect SA, a young woman who 
had just turned 18 (the age of majority) and was therefore an adult.308 When SA was a child, the 
Court had exercised its parens patriae and wardship jurisdictions to protect her from the risk of an 
unsuitable arranged marriage in Pakistan; the current question was whether the Court had the 
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jurisdiction to continue that protection now that she was an adult.309 SA had capacity to marry, but 
she was “undoubtedly vulnerable.”310 She functioned at the intellectual level of a 13- or 14-year-
old, had a reading age of about 7 or 8, was deaf and could not speak.311 She communicated by 
British Sign Language (BSL), which her parents did not use.312 She could not understand, lip read 
or sign in her family’s first language, Punjabi.313 As a result, it was doubtful that SA and her parents 
understood each other’s plans and wishes.314 If SA was placed outside the U.K. and surrounded by 
people who did not communicate in BSL, it was highly likely that she would become extremely 
distressed, develop psychological difficulties and feel extremely isolated, which would pose a 
significant risk to her mental health and well-being.315 SA’s wishes were clear: she wanted to 
eventually marry a Muslim man, but she did not want to live in Pakistan so he would have to speak 
English and be prepared to live in the U.K.316 The specific issue was whether, despite SA’s 
capacity to marry, the Court could put in place protective measures (e.g., require that marriage 
arrangements be made through BSL) which would enable SA to understand and give informed 
consent to the terms of the arranged marriage she would eventually face.317 Munby J. concluded 
that the Court had the jurisdiction to grant this relief.318 He found that SA was a vulnerable adult 
who had disabilities which may impair her ability to make a free choice and form real and genuine 
consent—even in the absence of any undue influence or misinformation.319  
 Munby J. declined to define who might fall into the vulnerable adult category; instead, he 
identified three non-exhaustive categories of vulnerability, namely constraint; coercion or undue 
influence; and other disabling circumstances: 
[T]he inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in relation to a vulnerable adult who, 
even if not incapacitated by mental disorder or mental illness, is, or is reasonably 
believed to be, either (i) under constraint or (ii) subject to coercion or undue 
influence or (iii) for some other reason deprived of the capacity to make the relevant 
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decision, or disabled from making a free choice, or incapacitated or disabled from 
giving or expressing a real and genuine consent.320 
 
Munby J. described constraint as referring to situations in which a person is incarcerated, confined, 
controlled or under a restraint which significantly curtails his freedom.321 Coercion or undue 
influence relates to the improper influence of another person.322 The third category of other 
disabling circumstances includes: 
the many other circumstances that may so reduce a vulnerable adult’s 
understanding and reasoning powers as to prevent him forming or expressing a real 
and genuine consent, for example, the effects of deception, misinformation, 
physical disability, illness, weakness (physical, mental or moral), tiredness, shock, 
fatigue, depression, pain or drugs. No doubt there are others.323  
 
Another example may be the maladaptive cognitive effects of loneliness. 
 In Re SK, Singer J. exercised the protective jurisdiction on an interim basis to ascertain 
whether an adult was in a situation which would justify the Court’s intervention.324 In that case, 
the proposed plaintiff (SK) was a young adult British citizen whose family was from 
Bangladesh.325 It was believed that she was being held against her will in her family’s home 
country and that she was at risk of a forced marriage, which would grossly interfere with her human 
rights and possibly result in criminal offences against her as her capacity to consent (e.g., to sexual 
relations) would have been “overborne by fear, duress or threat.”326 Singer J. also noted that if SK 
was forced to marry, she may experience “irreparable and severe physical and emotional 
consequences.”327 While the High Court’s wardship jurisdiction could not be invoked because SK 
was an adult, Singer J. held that the Court’s inherent jurisdiction could be used to provide a remedy. 
He found that the “declaratory jurisdiction” could be invoked to ascertain whether SK had been 
able to exercise her free will when making decisions about her civil status and country of 
residence.328 The judge hoped that this determination could be made by arranging for SK to be 
seen by a British consular official in Bangladesh, who could evaluate her circumstances and 
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ascertain her wishes in an unconstrained environment.329 To determine the precise whereabouts of 
SK, Singer J. ordered several relatives to appear before the Court to give information about her 
location.330 In a postscript, Singer J. states that SK was promptly interviewed by a consular official, 
and then she returned to England where she expressed her wish that the court proceeding be 
discontinued.331 Nevertheless, Singer J. expressed no reservations about invoking the jurisdiction; 
he stated that while the anxieties giving rise to the proceeding may have turned out to be “ill-
founded,” the situation made it appropriate for the Court to investigate SK’s circumstances.332 
 In Re G (An Adult) (Mental Capacity: Court’s Jurisdiction),333 Bennett J. used the 
jurisdiction as a pre-emptive measure to protect a capable adult.334 The case involved a 29-year-
old woman (G) with a history of mental illness whose father had been violent towards her, and 
having contact with him appeared to worsen her mental state.335 When G was incapable, an interim 
order had been put in place to limit contact between her and her father.336 At the time of the final 
hearing, G’s mental condition had improved and she was considered to be capable of making 
decisions about the nature and extent of contact with her father.337 However, Bennett J. was 
concerned that if the Court removed the protective framework that had been put in place when G 
was incapable, her mental state would likely deteriorate again, and he did not think that the 
jurisdiction should be “entirely dependent on the shifting sands” of G’s capacity at the time of the 
final hearing—the “focal point” should be the situation which resulted in her mental 
deterioration.338 Therefore, Bennett J. exercised the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, and he did so in 
a manner which scholars have described as a preventative measure to stop the “revolving door” 
scenario of mental illness.339  
 Further, in Local Authority X v MM & Anor (No. 1), Munby J. stated that courts can 
intervene to protect vulnerable adults from the risk of future harm as long as “there is a real 
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possibility, rather than a merely fanciful risk, of such harm.”340 He noted that such intervention 
ought to be exercised with a view to the vulnerable person’s happiness: 
[J]ust as wise parents resist the temptation to keep their children metaphorically 
wrapped up in cotton wool, so too we must avoid the temptation always to put the 
physical health and safety of the elderly and the vulnerable before everything else. 
Often it will be appropriate to do so, but not always. Physical health and safety can 
sometimes be bought at too high a price in happiness and emotional welfare. The 
emphasis must be on sensible risk appraisal, not striving to avoid all risk, whatever 
the price, but instead seeking a proper balance and being willing to tolerate 
manageable or acceptable risks as the price appropriately to be paid in order to 
achieve some other good – in particular to achieve the vital good of the elderly or 
vulnerable person’s happiness. What good is it making someone safer if it merely 
makes them miserable?341 
 
And from the reverse angle, the right to live at risk can be a hollow victory if it does not translate 
into a better quality of life for lonely older men. 
 The final case I address in this section is DL.342 It provides strong authority for the 
proposition that the English High Court may exercise its protective jurisdiction in relation to older 
adults “who plainly [have] mental capacity to make decisions for themselves.”343 In that case, the 
Court of Appeal considered whether the High Court properly exercised its jurisdiction to protect 
“an elderly married couple” from their adult son (DL), even though neither parent lacked mental 
capacity.344 The father (Mr. L) was 86-years-old; Mrs. L was 90.345 All three parties lived together 
in a house owned by Mr. L.346 DL was aggressive towards his parents, sometimes resulting in 
physical violence.347 His behaviour also included making verbal threats; restricting his parents’ 
visitors, including professional caregivers; trying to coerce his father to transfer him ownership of 
the house; and pressuring his parents to have Mrs. L moved into a care home against her wishes.348 
The local authority brought the proceedings to protect Mr. and Mrs. L from DL; however, Mrs. L 
wished to preserve her relationship with her son and she did not want any proceedings to be taken 
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against him.349 Mr. L’s wishes remained unclear.350 The High Court made interim injunction orders 
restraining DL’s aggressive and coercive behaviour towards his parents.351 On appeal, McFarlane 
LJ observed that the protective jurisdiction articulated by Munby J. clearly applies to adults who 
are vulnerable for reasons other than mental incompetence.352 Appearing to anticipate criticism, 
McFarlane LJ stated that the jurisdiction was not so extensive and all-encompassing that it would 
threaten the autonomy of every English adult; it was limited to adults with compromised decision-
making.353 Like Munby J., McFarlane LJ declined to delineate which adults may fall into the 
vulnerable adult category. Instead, he preferred to recognize “the ability of the common law to 
develop and adapt its jurisdiction, on a case by case basis, as may be required.”354  
 In a concurring judgment, Maurice Kay LJ suggested that it would be “most unfortunate” 
if the law did not protect vulnerable adults merely because they have capacity: 
Where a person lacks capacity [under] the MCA 2005, he has the protection 
provided by that statute. A person at the other end of the scale, who has that capacity 
and is not otherwise vulnerable, is able to protect himself against unscrupulous 
manipulation, if necessary by obtaining an injunction against his oppressor. This 
case is concerned with a category of people who, in reality, have neither of those 
remedies available for their protection. It would be most unfortunate if, by reference 
to their personal autonomy, they were to be beyond the reach of judicial protection. 
For the reasons given by my Lords, they are not.355 
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s injunctions which protected Mr. and Mrs. L.356 
 A common thread in the vulnerable adult decisions is the existence of a third party 
villain,357 which is similar to cases in which the doctrines of undue influence or unconscionability 
are applied. As the High Court noted in Spencer, the protective jurisdiction has been invoked when 
a vulnerable adult is at risk of coercion or abuse.358 Indeed, as the cases above demonstrate, there 
is “a judicial appetite for increased intervention [into] the lives of vulnerable people”359 who are 
                                                 
349 Ibid.          
350 Ibid.             
351 Ibid. Because Mr. L had become incapacitated by the time of the hearing, the High Court exercised its authority 
under the MCA 2005 to protect him; it used its inherent jurisdiction in relation to Mrs. L: ibid at para 5.    
352 Ibid at para 15.       
353 Ibid at paras 53-54.     
354 Ibid at para 64.          
355 Ibid at para 79 [emphasis added].            
356 Ibid at para 80.       
357 Dunn, Clare & Holland, supra note at 333. 
358 Supra note 271 at para 58.             
359 Kirsty Keywood, “Vulnerable Adults, Mental Capacity and Social Care Refusal” (2010) 18 Med L Rev 103 at 
110. 
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subjected to a third party predator. I suggest that it may also be justifiable to invoke the protective 
jurisdiction when there is an internal predator—loneliness—which compromises an adult’s 
exercise of free choice. 
 
4. Protective jurisdiction: the Canadian potential 
Through the combined effect of the evolution of the parens patriae jurisdiction and the emerging 
line of English protective jurisdiction case law, I argue that superior courts in Canada have an 
existing jurisdiction to intervene in the lives of capable lonely older men who are symptomatically 
refusing objectively needed home-based services. An initial objection would likely be that, unlike 
in England, the parens patriae jurisdiction has not disappeared in relation to incompetent adults; 
the jurisdiction remains alive and well. In England, it was the disappearance of parens patriae 
which triggered the courts to discover the protective jurisdiction. In Canada, such an inadvertent 
loss is unlikely. As the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal recently observed, it is 
arguable that the parens patriae jurisdiction is part of the provincial superior court’s “core” 
jurisdiction in s 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867,360 and therefore, cannot be eliminated without a 
constitutional amendment.361 Section 96 states, “The Governor General shall appoint the Judges 
of the Superior, District, and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate 
in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.”362 This section appears to be nothing more than a “staffing 
provision” (i.e., conferring the power to appoint judges); however, through judicial interpretation 
and the recognition of unwritten constitutional norms, it has come to constitutionally protect the 
superior courts’ inherent jurisdiction.363 Therefore, it can only be removed by constitutional 
amendment.364 
 If parens patriae had remained available to the English courts, it is possible that the 
protective jurisdiction would have never emerged; but it is also possible that the courts may have 
extended the underlying concept of the parens patriae jurisdiction (i.e., necessity) to respond to 
the needs of vulnerable adults who do not lack capacity. As I discuss below, there are indications 
                                                 
360 Supra note 255, s 96. 
361 J.T. v Newfoundland and Labrador (Child, Youth and Family Services), 2015 NLCA 55, [2015] NJ No 390 at 
para 15. 
362 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 255, s 96. 
363 Ref re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of 
the Prov. Court of P.E.I., [1997] 3 SCR 3, 1997 CanLII 317 at paras 88-95. 
364 Criminal Lawyers, supra note 227 at para 18; MacMillan, supra note 231 at para 15. 
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that the start of such an evolution is occurring in Canada, namely that some courts have loosened 
the parens patriae jurisdiction’s traditional “proof of incompetence” requirement. These cases 
have laid the groundwork for the second generation of parens patriae, or for conceptual clarity, 
the superior courts’ protective jurisdiction over vulnerable adults. Bringing vulnerable adults under 
the courts’ protective arm can be seen as an expansion of the traditional parens patriae jurisdiction, 
or as a new jurisdiction within the superior courts’ broader inherent jurisdiction (i.e., another 
category of inherent jurisdiction). 
 In Eve, La Forest J. stated that when using the parens patriae jurisdiction over adults, 
“proof of incompetence must, of course, be made.”365 However, as Fisher J. of the B.C. Supreme 
Court recently observed in Temoin v Martin, “Eve is not instructive about what ‘proof of 
incompetence’ means.”366 While the Alberta Court of Appeal has stated that there must be 
“compelling evidence of incompetence,”367 a line of cases suggest that something below this 
standard may be sufficient to justify the use of parens patriae. First, recall that in Perino, Corbett 
J. exercised the Ontario superior court’s parens patriae jurisdiction and inherent procedural 
powers to order that state-funded legal services be provided to a mentally disabled adult witness.368 
Corbett J. did not make a formal finding of incapacity; rather, he described the witness as “a 
vulnerable person … whose capacity to make decisions for herself [was] in question.”369  
 Second, in Temoin, a daughter petitioned for a declaration that her 87-year-old father, Mr. 
Martin, was incapable of managing his personal and financial affairs.370 Under the applicable 
legislation, a precondition of the hearing was that the daughter must provide affidavits from two 
medical practitioners setting out their opinion that Mr. Martin was incapable.371 Mr. Martin refused 
to see the doctors for a capacity assessment.372 Fisher J. found that there was a legislative gap with 
respect to individuals who needed the protection of the applicable statute, but would not cooperate 
in obtaining the required medical evidence.373 The gap was “particularly acute” because the adult’s 
                                                 
365 Eve, supra note 203 at para 36. 
366 2011 BCSC 1727, 2011 CarswellBC 3377 at para 64 [Temoin], aff’d 2012 BCCA 250, [2012] BCJ No 1174 
[Temoin CA]. 
367 U. (J.) v Alberta (Director of Child Welfare), 2001 ABCA 125, 281 AR 396 at para 5, leave to appeal to SCC 
refused [2001] SCCA No 381. 
368 Supra note 207.             
369 Ibid at para 42 [emphasis added].     
370 Temoin CA, supra note 366 at paras 1 & 4. 
371 Ibid at para 2.         
372 Ibid.             
373 Ibid at paras 48-49.           
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refusal flowed from his apparent incapability: “In these cases, the requirement of two medical 
opinions, designed to protect individual autonomy, become an impediment that places individuals 
who are incapable of making free choices beyond assistance.”374 Despite the legal presumption of 
capacity, Fisher J. found that the “proof of incompetence” standard would be met if there was 
evidence that the person was prima facie incompetent.375 The standard would be “something less 
than the court being satisfied that the person is incapable.”376 In Mr. Martin’s case, there was some 
evidence that he lacked testamentary capacity, but in accordance with the functional approach to 
capacity, Fisher J. held that it was of little assistance to the determination of whether he lacked 
capacity to manage his personal and financial affairs.377 Ultimately, Fisher J. found that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Martin was prima facie incompetent, and therefore, she 
declined to exercise the parens patriae jurisdiction to order a medical examination.378  
 Third, in Seaman, the Alberta Surrogate Court exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction over 
two proposed—but not formally declared—incapable adults.379 In that case, two daughters were 
seeking guardianship of their mothers, and applied to have the Court waive the service requirement 
because there was medical and other evidence that service would be detrimental to their mothers’ 
health and therefore not in their best interests.380 Under the applicable legislation, both the Court 
and the Public Guardian had to consent to the dispensation, but in the case at bar, the Public 
Guardian would not consent.381 The Court found that the legislation did not contemplate a situation 
in which the Public Guardian was acting unreasonably, thereby causing an unacceptable delay and 
potentially causing harm to proposed dependent adults.382 The Court held that its parens patriae 
jurisdiction could be invoked to dispense with service on the proposed dependent adults, if service 
would not be in their best interests, and when the Public Guardian was unreasonably refusing to 
consent to the dispensation.383 
                                                 
374 Ibid at para 51.            
375 Temoin, supra note 366 at para 64. 
376 Ibid [emphasis added].             
377 Ibid at paras 66-69.             
378 Ibid at paras 56 & 65. 
379 Supra note 203.        
380 Ibid at para 1.            
381 Ibid at para 4.                
382 Ibid at para 17.            
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 Similarly, in McMaster v McMaster, the Ontario Superior Court exercised its parens 
patriae jurisdiction over an older woman without making a formal finding of incapacity.384 In that 
case, an affluent 80-year-old woman (Ms. McMaster) granted her two sons (Graeme and Malcolm) 
a general continuing power of attorney.385 Over time, Ms. McMaster’s health deteriorated, as did 
her finances.386 Graeme was unaware that he was an attorney, until he sought a passing of accounts 
from Malcolm.387 Concerned about Malcolm’s financial mismanagement, Graeme sought to have 
Malcolm removed as a property attorney.388 Under the applicable legislation, the Court had the 
authority to terminate, on its own initiative, an attorney’s power under an incapable person’s 
continuing power of attorney; however, the statute applied to people with general overall 
incapacity (as opposed to just financial incapacity).389 The evidence suggested that Ms. McMaster 
may have had financial incapacity, which could exist without a formal “legal diagnosis of 
incapacity.”390 Whitten J. found that there was a legislative gap since the provision protected 
people with general overall incapacity, but not financial incapacity (a difference he said was 
“practically speaking academic”).391 He relied upon the parens patriae jurisdiction to fill the gap 
and protect Ms. McMaster by removing Malcolm as her property attorney.392 Notably, it appears 
that Whitten J. even declined to conclude that Ms. McMaster was financially incapable; he did, 
however, find her to be vulnerable:  
Even if it were necessary in order to declare [Ms. McMaster] fiscally incapable, 
more detailed medical evidence is necessary, what evidence exists is clearly that of 
an elderly vulnerable person who because of her memory deficits and her 
“dementia”…. is the embodiment of an individual who needs protection of the 
court, otherwise she is a pawn in the investment schemes of her son.393  
 
Taken together, Perino, Temoin, Seaman and McMaster challenge the strict understanding of the 
parens patriae jurisdiction’s “proof of incompetence” requirement. In these cases, the jurisdiction 
was invoked without a formal finding of incapacity. Indeed, in McMaster, Whitten J. extended the 
protection to a vulnerable older adult whose incapacity had not been established.    
                                                 
384 2013 ONSC 1115, [2013] OJ No 877 [McMaster]. 
385 Ibid at para 1.               
386 Ibid at para 2.            
387 Ibid at para 3.               
388 Ibid.                       
389 Ibid at paras 3 & 21.              
390 Ibid at paras 10 & 53.               
391 Ibid at paras 28 & 55.              
392 Ibid at paras 56 & 63.            
393 Ibid at para 56 [emphasis added].              
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CHAPTER V: PARENS PATRIAE 2.0 – PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION 
 
In case law and mainstream narratives about older people, loneliness is usually presented as an 
emotion that makes one vulnerable to financial abuse.394 A classic story involves an older man 
who falls victim to a younger woman who preys on his lonely heart and drains his bank account. 
“Right to live at risk” advocates defend his objectively unwise decisions on the grounds that he 
can do what he wants; if having someone in his life fills a void in his heart, who are we to judge? 
But this feel-good account presents loneliness in a colloquial sense; it glosses over the clinical or 
evidence-based understanding of loneliness which suggests that lonely people tend to behave in 
paradoxically self-defeating ways, such as unwittingly pushing people away, despite 
simultaneously desiring social connection. 
 Lonely older men’s maladaptive social cognition has the potential to negatively affect a 
range of relationships, including those with concerned third parties such as social workers who 
offer them objectively needed home-based services. Rather than simply viewing their refusal of 
services as an assertion of their right to live at risk, it may be more appropriate to view the rejection 
as a symptom of their loneliness. They are symptomatic refusers, not libertarian flag-bearers.  
 While in many cases, social workers and other concerned parties can skillfully overcome 
such hostility, there may be situations in which a lonely older man does not relent. Or he may 
initially accept help, and then change his mind. Abandoning him risks confirming his negative 
expectations of others, and thus further cementing his maladaptive social cognition. Yet labelling 
him as incapable or using mental health legislation to force intervention is too heavy-handed, and 
it places him at considerable risk of unnecessary institutionalisation. Invoking the superior courts’ 
protection jurisdiction offers a less intrusive solution. 
 This chapter sets out my proposed framework for invoking a superior court’s protective 
jurisdiction to respond to the needs of lonely older men who do not lack capacity but are 
symptomatically refusing objectively needed home-based services. First, I identify the general 
                                                 
394 See e.g. Ross-Scott, supra note 180; Nathalie Martin, “Consumer Scams and the Elderly: Preserving 
Independence Through Shifting Default Rules” (2009) 17:1 Elder LJ 1 at 5; Jessica Coombs, “Scamming the 
Elderly: An Increased Susceptibility to Financial Exploitation Within and Outside of the Family” (2014) 7 Alb 
Gov’t L Rev 243 at 248; Kerri Griffin, “Safeguarding Against Golden Opportunities” (2010) 2 Est Plan & Cmty 
Prop LJ 441 at 448 & 454; Jeffrey L. Bratkiewicz, “‘Here’s A Quarter, Call Someone Who Cares’; Who Is 
Answering the Elderly’s Call for Protection from Telemarketing Fraud?” (2000) 45 SD L Rev 586 at 589; Shelby 
A.D. Moore & Jeanette Schaefer, “Remembering the Forgotten Ones: Protecting the Elderly from Financial Abuse” 
(2004) 41 San Diego L Rev 505 at 517-18 & fn 55. 
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circumstances in which a court may be justified in exercising its protective jurisdiction. While 
some situations may be classified as “self-neglect,” I explain that I am referring more generally to 
the rejection of services which purport to facilitate aging-in-place. Second, I suggest that dignity 
ought to serve as the guiding principle. Third, using B.C.’s legislation as a point of reference, I 
discuss the legislative gap which currently exists in its adult guardianship/protection and mental 
health laws. Fourth, I review the general nature of protective jurisdiction orders. Fifth, I propose 
that the protective jurisdiction ought to be exercised in the most effective, less intrusive manner. 
“Most effective, less intrusive” language guides statutory interventions,395 but as a line of cases 
demonstrate, it is often just rhetoric, especially when an older adult is refusing in-home services 
and is subsequently deemed incapable of making a care home admission decision. I conclude the 
chapter with a discussion of three practical challenges of effectively using the protective 
jurisdiction: limited resources; enforceability; and service provider safety. 
 
1. Proposed framework 
a. Circumstances justifying intervention 
There may be various circumstances in which a court may be justified in exercising its protective 
jurisdiction over a symptomatic refuser. Each situation needs to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis, and therefore, it would be unwise to provide a list of refusals which may trigger the 
jurisdiction. Refusing meals on wheels and nursing care may be enough in one case, but not 
another. I am particularly concerned with situations in which a lonely older man refuses home-
based services and is then deemed incapable so third parties can simply institutionalise him. 
 Generally speaking, I am referring to the rejection of services that purport to facilitate 
aging-in-place; that is, services which aim to help older adults delay or avoid institutionalisation 
and remain in their own home for as long as possible. For better or worse, aging-in-place has 
emerged as the common policy response to the aging population. The approach is consistent with 
the dominant narrative which says that most older adults wish to remain in their current home and 
intergenerational community for as long as possible.396 It also aligns with the recognition that 
housing older adults in institutional settings is an expensive and potentially unsustainable 
endeavour. While numbers vary across jurisdictions, it is commonly reported that home care is a 
                                                 
395 See Adult Guardianship Act, RSBC 1996, c 6, s 56(5) [BC AGA]. 
396 See e.g. Petra de Jong et al, “Housing Preferences of an Ageing Population: Investigation in the Diversity Among 
Dutch Older Adults” (2012) Netspar Discussion Paper 07/2012-024 at 25. 
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less costly alternative to institutionalisation. For example, the North East Ontario Local Health 
Integration Network found that the average daily cost of a long-term care bed was $126, while 
home care was $42.397 Providing care in a hospital bed was the most expensive, at $842 per day.398 
Coupled with the active aging approach, this economic reality has pushed governments of all levels 
to announce, and occasionally implement, a number of fiscal and public policy changes to facilitate 
aging-in-place.399 While the aging-in-place movement will positively impact many Canadians, the 
concept may be oversold, with many older adults “now occupying inappropriate residential 
environments.”400 Driven by a highly libertarian approach, the shift from institutionalisation to 
community care may not translate into a better quality of life for lonely older men who fall on the 
“right” side of the fictitious capacity dichotomy, and paradoxically reject services.  
 In some cases, the lonely older man’s circumstances may be classified as “self-neglect.” 
Interestingly, loneliness has been linked to Diogenes syndrome, an extreme form of elder self-
neglect that is generally characterised by hoarding, domestic squalor and the refusal of external 
help.401 However, we must proceed with caution when invoking the term “self-neglect,” which has 
an “almost bewildering” number of manifestations and is a difficult concept to define.402 B.C.’s 
Adult Guardianship Act defines “self-neglect” as: 
                                                 
397 Home Care Ontario, Home Care Services, “Facts & Figures - Publicly Funded Home Care”, online: 
<www.homecareontario.ca>.  
398 Ibid.      
399 See Liberal Party of Canada, “A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class” (2015), online: <www.liberal.ca> at 9 
(campaign promise to invest $3 billion over four years to improve the quality and accessibility of home care); Susan 
Lunn, “Home care money still to come, Health Minister Jane Philpott promises” CBC News (26 March 2016), 
online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/federal-budget-home-care-philpott-1.3506472> (home care campaign 
promise part of larger, ongoing negotiations with the provinces and territories around health funding); B.C. 
Government, News Release, “$2 million helps support seniors to stay at home longer” (13 June 2014), online: 
<https://news.gov.bc.ca/stories/2-million-helps-support-seniors-to-stay-at-home-longer> (United Way program 
providing non-medical home support to older adults); Income Tax Act, RSBC 1996, c 215, Part 11 & Income Tax 
Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 118.04(3) (tax credits helping seniors with the cost of home modifications); City of 
Winnipeg, “Age-Friendly Winnipeg: Action Plan” (May 2014), online: <www.winnipeg.ca> at 8 (creating age-
friendly communities through initiatives such as low-floor buses which improve accessibility). 
400 See e.g. Stephen M. Golant quoted in Fredick Kunkle, “Aging in place concept has been oversold, professor 
argues” The Washington Post (5 March 2015), online: <www.washingtonpost.com>. 
401 Alejandra Saldarriaga-Cantillo & Juan Carlos Rivas Nieto, “Noah Syndrome: A Variant of Diogenes Syndrome 
Accompanied by Animal Hoarding Practices” (2015) 27 J Elder Abuse & Neglect 270; Benjamin Boynton, 
Indicators of Diogenes Syndrome in Community Dwelling Elderly (PhD Thesis, Walden University, College of 
Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2014) [unpublished]. The causal relationship between loneliness and Diogenes 
syndrome is not clear cut. 
402 Suzy Braye, David Orr & Michael Preston-Shoot, “Self-neglect and adult safeguarding: findings from research”, 
Final Report to the Department of Health, Adults’ Services SCIE Report 46 (September 2011), online: 
<http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/22841/1/Self_neglect_report.pdf> at 8. 
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any failure of an adult to take care of himself or herself that causes, or is reasonably 
likely to cause within a short period of time, serious physical or mental harm or 
substantial damage or loss in respect of the adult’s financial affairs, and includes 
(a) living in grossly unsanitary conditions, 
(b) suffering from an untreated illness, disease or injury, 
(c) suffering from malnutrition to such an extent that, without intervention, 
the adult’s physical or mental health is likely to be severely impaired, 
(d) creating a hazardous situation that will likely cause serious physical 
harm to the adult or others or cause substantial damage to or loss of 
property, and 
(e) suffering from an illness, disease or injury that results in the adult 
dealing with his or her financial affairs in a manner that is likely to cause 
substantial damage or loss in respect of those financial affairs.403 
This definition applies to adults with and without capacity; that is, the statutory meaning of “self-
neglect” in B.C. is not contingent upon the adult being incapable.404 As a result, a support and 
assistance plan may be offered to a capable adult, although he can refuse to accept it.405  
 B.C.’s definition of “self-neglect” can be contrasted with the one in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. In that province, the statutory definition only applies to people who lack capacity.406 
Thus, vulnerable adults with capacity fall outside the scope of the province’s statutory adult 
protective services; in other words, statutory service plans are only offered to those who lack 
capacity.  
 “Self-neglect” is also a problematic term because it is a value-laden social construct, 
influenced by the socio-economic status and cultural values of assessors.407 Compare the Ontario 
                                                 
403 BC AGA, supra note 395, s 1(“self-neglect”). 
404 Ibid. See also British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl, 2nd 
Sess, Vol 12 No 7 (15 July 1993) at 8757 (C Serwa). 
405 BC AGA, ibid, ss 1(“self-neglect”) & 53(4)-(5). The different approaches may be partly explained by the 
provinces’ reporting regimes for the general public. Newfoundland and Labrador has mandatory reporting; that is, a 
person who reasonably believes that an adult is self-neglected (or abused or neglected) must immediately report the 
information (Adult Protection Act, SNL 2011, c A-4.01, s 12 [NL APA]). In B.C., reporting is discretionary (BC 
AGA, ibid, s 46(1)). 
406 NL APA, ibid, s 2(p)(“self-neglect”). 
407 See generally William Lauder, “The utility of self-care theory as a theoretical basis for self-neglect” (2001) 34:4 J 
Adv Nursing 545. Geographic location may also affect perceptions; rural communities may have a higher level of 
tolerance for self-neglect: see J. Harbison et al, “Offering the help that’s needed: responses to the mistreatment and 
neglect of older people in a rural Canadian context” (2004) 9:2 Rural Social Work 147. 
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cases of M.G. (Re)408 and AP (Re).409 Since Ontario does not have adult protection legislation,410 
they are not statutory self-neglect cases per se. Both were decided under the province’s Health 
Care Consent Act, 1996,411 and addressed whether the older adults lacked capacity to make a care 
home admission decision. M.G. involved a 77-year-old woman with multiple serious medical 
conditions, including but not limited to diabetes, hypertension, osteoporosis and possible schizoid 
personality.412 Her leg had been amputated, which confined her to a wheelchair.413 Over a two year 
period, she had been admitted to the hospital nine times (due to pain from sores), and these 
episodes involved a pattern of behaviour in which she would be discharged with her agreeing to 
accept community care support, but once she returned to home, she would cancel the services.414 
M.G. would tell authorities that she would be away visiting a friend, but in fact she remained in 
her supportive housing unit.415 In her apartment, there were plastic bags filled with garbage and 
infested with cockroaches; there was rotting food in the refrigerator; and her wheelchair was 
covered in urine and feces.416 Because of her situation, she was at high risk of eviction.417 M.G. 
attended the Ontario Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) hearing to challenge her doctor’s 
assessment that she was incapable. In upholding the incapacity finding, the panel member (a 
lawyer) stated: 
Ms. M.G. brought a blue recycling garbage bag to the hearing. She had packages 
of paper in the bag, and spent much of her time sorting through the 
materials. Because of the concern about infection, Ms. M.G. was at a separate table 
from the panel members. She seemed content with her isolated position.418  
 
The panel member further stated that M.G.’s “constant assertions that she was not sick, and that 
she could take care of herself, when added to her obvious preference for isolation and pattern of 
socially avoidant behaviour, prevented her from passing [the capacity test].”419  
                                                 
408 2008 CanLII 28425 (ON CCB) [M.G.]. 
409 2011 CanLII 29197 (ON CCB) [AP]. 
410 There has been at least one attempt to have adult protection legislation in Ontario: see Bill 30, An Act to protect 
adults from abuse and neglect, 4th Sess, 37th Leg, Ontario, 2003 (first reading 21 May 2003). 
411 SO 1996, c 2, Sch A [ON HCCA]. 
412 M.G., supra note 408 at 4. 
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 Similar to M.G., A.P. was a single 86-year-old woman who lived alone in her rented 
apartment.420 She had poor vision and hearing, but no mobility issues.421 Unlike M.G., A.P. was 
described as “‘spry’ for her age” and “fiercely independent.”422 She did her own shopping and 
cooking, and refused community supports such as meals on wheels.423 A.P. believed she could 
receive the internet through a connection in her head, although this delusion did not relate to the 
matter at hand; that is, she was not hearing voices that counselled her against admission.424 In 
finding her capable, the panel member stated that throughout her testimony, A.P. was “articulate 
and eloquent” and that “[i]t was clear that her opposition to admission arose from her fierce spirit 
of independence.”425 Recall that in M.G., the panel member made a point of noting that M.G. had 
brought a garbage bag to the hearing, was placed at a separate table with those bags and exhibited 
socially avoidant behaviour. M.G. was found incapable; A.P., on the other hand, was found 
capable.426 A.P. fit the privileged-class narrative; M.G. and her garbage bags did not. 
 ARC (Re) is another case characterised by underlying value-judgments that implicitly 
associate, if not equate, the “right” appearance with capacity.427 In that case, a 76-year-old farmer 
suffered from several physical conditions, a personality disorder and dementia.428 He was admitted 
to a psychiatric facility because he uttered threats against his family, was depressed and had 
suicidal ideation.429 He was eventually transferred to a medical ward for his physical ailments, and 
a registered nurse assessed him as being incapable of making a care home admission decision and 
managing his property.430 In finding Mr. ARC capable, the CCB panel member stated: 
Although Mr. ARC did not testify, he was present and I had the opportunity to 
observe him and to watch his interactions with others during the hearing. There was 
nothing to suggest to me that on the day of the hearing, he lacked the cognitive 
ability to comprehend information relevant to admission to a care facility.     
 
For example, this was not a situation where the patient had been wheeled into the 
hearing prone on a hospital bed and without any discernible interaction with others 
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or comprehension of the hearing proceedings. He spoke several sentences in my 
presence, and presented as a pleasant, active and concerned senior citizen.431 
 
There are exceptions to these value-laden decisions, including Koch (Re), which is a leading 
authority supporting the proposition that a third party’s value judgments and personal beliefs are 
irrelevant to capacity evaluations.432 Koch was a 37-year-old woman who suffered from multiple 
sclerosis and was mostly confined to a wheelchair.433 During separation agreement negotiations, 
her husband alleged that she was incapable of making a care home admission decision and 
managing her financial affairs.434 An evaluator who found Koch incapable noted that her home 
was “‘very cluttered, disorganized, [with] food in all rooms.’”435 However, Quinn J. of the Ontario 
Court of Justice largely dismissed these observations: “Although I have great difficulty in elevating 
an untidy apartment to the point where it is an indicia of mental incapacity, in fairness, before so 
concluding, [the evaluator] should have given [Koch] an opportunity to explain the state of the 
premises. A perfectly logical explanation might have been forthcoming.”436 Quinn J. found that 
Koch had in fact given such an explanation when responding to her lawyer’s questions during the 
capacity hearing: 
Q. Now, we’ve heard some discussion about your apartment being cluttered. 
A. It’s worse than that. 
Q. So, it was worse than that... 
A. Well, you can’t do much from a wheelchair, your legs don’t walk. I wash my 
own dishes, do my laundry. I’m very embarrassed, okay?437 
 
Quinn J. also took issue with the evaluator’s reliance on the fact that during the capacity 
assessment, Koch pulled a bra out of a bag and needed help putting it on: 
[The evaluator] never afforded the appellant the opportunity to explain the bra 
incident. The explanation might have been entirely logical. Perhaps the appellant, 
if she is physically unable to put on her bra, as appears to be the case, decided that 
morning to have her bra handy since she was expecting a female visitor whose 
                                                 
431 Ibid at 6 [emphasis added].                  
432 Supra note 10 at para 54. See also Jennifer L. Wright, “Guardianship for your own good: Improving the well-
being of respondents and wards in the USA” (2010) 33 Intl J L & Psychiatry 350 at 360: 
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be presented, especially out of context, as signs of diminishing mental capacity? 
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assistance she could enlist. This is but one of many examples of [the evaluator] 
injecting her own value judgments into the process; [the evaluator] does not carry 
her bra in a bag and so anyone who does must be mentally incapacitated.438 
 
In finding Koch capable, Quinn J. reiterated that the Court did not care “a whit” about evaluators’ 
personal beliefs and values, which are “anathema” to the capacity assessment process.439 
 BS (Re) is another exception to the line of value-laden cases. In that case, an 85-year-old 
Italian immigrant with Alzheimer’s disease needed 24-hour care to remain at home.440 B.S. did not 
want to move into long-term care, but capacity evaluators found her incapable of making an 
admission decision.441 When weighing the evidence, the CCB panel member proceeded cautiously: 
In my consideration of the evidence in this hearing, I have had to be very careful 
with much of it…. Evidence of poor hygiene or excessive alcohol consumption or 
inadequate nutrition, for example, is only relevant insofar as it speaks to whether 
the applicant is capable of making admissions decisions. An applicant who is 
capable of making his/her own admissions decisions may remain in his/her own 
home, not cleaning adequately, eating poorly and drinking to excess.442  
 
Nevertheless, the panel member found B.S. to be incapable.443 
 As I conclude this section, it is important to note that I am not arguing that loneliness itself 
is “self-neglect” or an independent “problem” that would trigger the protective jurisdiction on its 
own. I am proposing that loneliness is an internal constraint on a lonely person’s exercise of free 
choice in relation to a decision about objectively needed in-home services such as home care.  
 
b. Dignity as the guiding principle 
The principles of autonomy and protection are frequently invoked as competing interests. In 
relation to patients’ decision-making rights, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently treated 
autonomy (i.e., the right to decide what happens to one’s body and life) as a fundamental interest 
that trumps all others.444 As a result, the right to medical self-determination is not vitiated by the 
                                                 
438 Ibid at para 41. 
439 Ibid at paras 54 & 70. 
440 BS, supra note 117 at 4-5.  
441 Ibid at 5.              
442 Ibid at 18. See also Russell v Calgary General Hospital, 2004 ABQB 102, 352 AR 168 (“The mere fact that a 
person conducts herself in a manner which is unhealthy or fails to accept treatment recommended by a physician, 
does not justify … detention [under the Mental Health Act]” at para 49). 
443 BS, ibid at 20. 
444 See Cuthbertson v Rasouli, 2013 SCC 53, [2013] 3 SCR 341 at para 19 (withdrawal of life support requires 
patient consent in Ontario); Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 at para 67 
[Carter] (unconstitutionality of criminal prohibition on doctor-assisted dying). See also Timothy Caulfield, 
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seriousness of the risks or consequences that may flow from the patient’s decision.445 Hence the 
courts have found that capable adults have the right to refuse life-saving treatment,446 and more 
recently, the right to doctor-assisted death if they have a grievous and irremediable medical 
condition that causes enduring suffering that is subjectively intolerable.447 While I do not intend 
to debate the controversial issue of doctor-assisted death, I will make one observation in relation 
to loneliness. A recent study from the Netherlands shows that nearly 50 percent of people whose 
request for assisted dying was approved identified loneliness as a reason for wanting to die.448 In 
response to these findings, bioethicists Barron Lerner and Arthur Caplan observe, “Loneliness, 
even if accompanied by other symptoms, hardly seems a condition best addressed by offering 
death.”449 Yet loneliness is not mentioned by the Carter trial judge, Court of Appeal or Supreme 
Court of Canada.450 To be sure, the trial judge addresses depression and cognitive impairment (e.g., 
dementia, delirium, delusions), but she does so under the rubric of capacity.451 If these conditions 
impair a person’s ability to make authentic decisions, it may render them incapable.452 However, 
as one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses testified, most people with depression will not be 
cognitively impaired to the point of being incompetent.453 Similarly, it is likely that most people 
suffering from loneliness will not be cognitively impaired to the point that they are incapable. Thus 
if the person is capable, internal vulnerabilities such as loneliness are irrelevant. The trial judge 
also addresses voluntariness, which could theoretically include an analysis of loneliness as an 
                                                 
“Revisiting Core Principles: Autonomy, Consent, and the Biobanking Challenge” in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine 
Gibson, eds, Health Law at the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007), 169 at 169 & 172. Putting 
aside the complexities of public health risks (e.g., communicable disease) and circumstances where there is no time 
to ascertain a patient’s wishes (e.g., emergencies). 
445 Carter, ibid at para 67; Fleming v Reid (1991), 82 DLR (4th) 298, 4 OR (3d) 74 (CA) at para 33 (cited to WL 
Canada) (doctor must respect preferences of two involuntary mental health patients with schizophrenia to not take 
anti-psychotic drugs) [Fleming]. 
446 Malette v Shulman (1990), 67 DLR (4th) 321, [1990] OJ No 450 (CA) (doctor liable for battery because he gave 
an unconscious Jehovah’s Witness a blood transfusion despite her signed card stating she would not consent to a 
transfusion). 
447 Carter, supra note 444 at para 127. 
448 Marianne C. Snijdewind et al, “A Study of the First Year of the End-of-Life Clinic for Physician-Assisted Dying 
in the Netherlands” (10 August 2015) JAMA Intern Med doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2015.3978 at Table 3. Among 
those whose request was denied, 71.5 percent identified loneliness as a reason for wanting to die.  
449 Barron H. Lerner & Arthur L. Caplan, “Euthanasia in Belgium and the Netherlands: On a Slippery Slope?” (10 
August 2015) JAMA Intern Med doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2015.4086. 
450 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 BCSC 886, [2012] BCJ No 1196 [Carter BCSC], rev’d 2013 BCCA 
435, 365 DLR (4th) 351, aff’d Carter, supra note 444 (the terms loneliness and lonely do not appear; isolated is 
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451 Carter BCSC, ibid at paras 770-98. 
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internal constraint that falls below the incapacity threshold, but the judge’s discussion is limited to 
“outside forces” that influence decision-making (e.g., coercion, undue influence).454 There is 
recognition that a capable person can act involuntarily due to external factors (and thus vitiate 
consent), but it appears that internal factors have to rise to the level of incapacity—an unlikely 
outcome in the case of loneliness. The combined effect of the trial judge’s analysis is the 
perpetuation of the artificial distinction between capable adults and internally vulnerable adults. 
Capable adults with internal vulnerabilities (e.g., loneliness) fall through the cracks. Similar to 
Maurice Kay LJ’s observation in DL, it would be most unfortunate if, by reference to their 
capacity, internally vulnerable adults were left to their own maladaptive devices. Yet given the 
premium our courts have placed on autonomy, this is precisely the situation in which lonely older 
men find themselves. 
 There are at least three approaches to remedying this lopsided problem. First, if we frame 
the challenge as a tension between two competing values, the straightforward solution is to place 
more emphasis on protection and less on autonomy. But simply pitting these interests against one 
another will inevitably result in outcomes that are either too libertarian or too paternalistic. This is 
the current situation, with autonomy trumping all other interests. An overly protectionist 
environment is also undesirable. Second, if we replace the liberal individualist actor with the 
vulnerable subject,455 the once competing interests of autonomy and protection are no longer 
oppositional. The apparent tension between the interests can be reconciled because truly fostering 
a symptomatic refuser’s individualistic autonomy requires that we first release him from decision-
making constraints. Thus interventions that create room for unencumbered decision-making are 
justified on the grounds that they actually facilitate the person’s autonomy. This position has merit; 
however, I prefer a third approach that moves away from the autonomy/protection debate. 
 When a court is determining whether to exercise its protective jurisdiction, I propose that 
dignity serve as the guiding principle. While the concept has been defined in various ways, dignity 
essentially means that every human being has intrinsic value, merely by being human.456 The 
                                                 
454 Ibid at para 799. 
455 See Martha Albertson Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition” (2008) 
20 Yale JL & Feminism 1 (vulnerability is inherent in the human condition); Martha Albertson Fineman, “The 
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456 Quebec (Public Curator) v Syndicat national des employés de l'hôpital St-Ferdinand, [1996] 3 SCR 211, 1996 
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problem is that dignity has become strongly and solely associated with the concept of autonomy, 
and thus in opposition to protection. Outside of the equality rights context, the courts consistently 
put “autonomy and dignity” on one side, and “protection” on the other. In Carter, the Court states, 
“This is a question that asks us to balance competing values of great importance. On the one hand 
stands the autonomy and dignity of a competent adult who seeks death as a response to a grievous 
and irremediable medical condition. On the other stands the sanctity of life and the need to protect 
the vulnerable.”457 When autonomy and protection are in issue, courts invoke dignity to shield 
people against state intrusion, but dignity ought to be given equal consideration on the protection 
side of the equation. What is being protected may well be a lonely older man’s dignity. At a 
minimum, putting “protection and dignity” together allows us to explore this possibility.  
 
c. Legislative gap: lonely older men with capacity 
For the court to invoke its protective jurisdiction, there must be a legislative gap which results in 
lonely older men’s best interests not being met. In B.C., the adult guardianship and protection laws 
(collectively referred to as the “adult guardianship regime”) and the Mental Health Act (MHA)458 
do not protect lonely older men who are symptomatically refusing home-based services; nor has 
the provincial government ousted the superior court’s protective jurisdiction over these vulnerable 
adults by clear and precise statutory language. 
 
i. Adult guardianship/protection regime 
The statutes governing the adult guardianship regime do not provide a mechanism to protect 
vulnerable adults who do not lack capacity but are refusing objectively needed home-based 
services; instead, the right to live at risk prevails. Critics may argue that the gap is intentional; that 
is, the legislature specifically designed the adult guardianship regime to ensure all capable adults 
can refuse support, assistance or protection. From this perspective, using the protective jurisdiction 
would be contrary to the legislative will. However, this argument becomes less convincing when 
the legal environment in which the legislation was designed is taken into account. When the B.C. 
legislature introduced reforms to the province’s adult guardianship regime in 1993,459 the existing 
                                                 
457 Carter, supra note 444 at para 2 [emphasis added].      
458 BC MHA, supra note 175. 
459 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol 11 No 7 
(17 June 1993) at 7369 (Hon C Gabelmann) [Gabelmann, 17 June 1993]. 
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substitute decision-making legislation was highly paternalistic and out of step with the functional 
approach to capacity. In particular, the Patients Property Act was criticised for perpetuating a 
global incapacity model, in which an adult either had capacity or not; the Act failed to recognize 
that an adult may be capable of making some decisions but not others.460 After extensive 
community consultation,461 the legislature unanimously passed four pieces of legislation to 
modernise the adult guardianship system: the Adult Guardianship Act (AGA),462 the Health Care 
(Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act (HCCCFA Act),463 the Representation Agreement 
Act (RAA)464 and the Public Guardian and Trustee Act.465 When introducing the reforms, the 
government implicitly referred to the problems with the all-or-nothing approach to incapacity, 
namely that adults subjected to, or at risk of becoming subjected to, the existing regime lost control 
over all personal and/or property decisions: 
The existing legislative scheme can no longer respond to the needs and wishes of 
individuals directly affected by the legislation, their families and the professionals 
who provide support and services. Individuals who are directly affected by this 
package of legislation want the right to make their own decisions to the greatest 
extent possible, often relying on the support and assistance of family members and 
friends. These … bills clearly establish an adult’s right to make his or her own 
decisions….466 
 
The new system was intended to “provide a balance between an adult’s right to make his or her 
own decisions and society’s obligation to protect individuals who are unable to make decisions 
because of diminished mental capacity.”467 The reforms would allow adults, who would otherwise 
be deemed incapable, to make as many of their own decisions as possible, and allow adults to 
arrange in advance who would make decisions on their behalf if they lost capacity in the future. In 
large part, the government was proposing the changes to better respect the decision-making rights 
of adults who fell or were at risk of falling within an archaic guardianship model; adults who 
                                                 
460 B.C. Law Institute, “A Comparative Analysis of Adult Guardianship Laws in BC, New Zealand and Ontario” 
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remained capable were already sheltered from the overly paternalistic regime. As such, the strong 
liberal-individualistic tone of the legislative debates and new guardianship system ought to be read 
in part as a response to the annihilation of “incapable” adult’s decision-making rights. The existing 
climate demanded a forceful remedy, and the legislature pushed the pendulum very far in favour 
of autonomy. It was an understandable action given the legal environment, but sadly, it has left us 
with a situation in which symptomatic refusers with “sub-incapacity” constraints such as loneliness 
are condemned to needless suffering. 
 To be sure, capable older adults were also beneficiaries of the reforms. Compared to 
younger adults, it is well-documented that society has traditionally been less tolerant of older 
adults’ “unwise” and “risky” decisions, especially if their choices are not in accordance with their 
doctor’s proposed course of action or adult children’s preferences.468 Take the case of Bartoszek v 
Ontario (Consent and Capacity Board).469 Mrs. Bartoszek was a 76-year-old widow living alone 
in a rented apartment.470 She was less than five feet tall and therefore struggled to get into and out 
of her bed which was too high.471 Given some of her physical difficulties, neighbours and family 
helped her out by taking her bill payments to the bank and delivering groceries.472 One day she fell 
and injured her hip, although she was able to independently make her way to the hospital.473 While 
hospitalised, a social worker conducted a capacity assessment; during the assessment, Mrs. 
Bartoszek’s daughter was present and “had expressed the desire that her mother ought to be 
admitted into a care facility.”474 The social worker determined that Mrs. Bartoszek was incapable 
of making a care home admission decision, and as a result, she was institutionalised against her 
will.475 Mrs. Bartoszek’s daughter then terminated her mother’s rental agreement and told the care 
home that, if her mother left, she would not provide any support services.476 In agreeing with the 
social worker’s capacity assessment, the CCB panel member identified several risks if Mrs. 
                                                 
468 See Law Commission of England, “Mental Incapacity” Law Com No 231 (28 February 1995), online: 
<www.gov.uk> at 33; Wright, “Protecting”, supra note 35 at 71; Kenneth Sakauye, Geriatric Psychiatry Basics 
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472 Ibid at paras 2-3.           
473 Ibid at para 4.             
474 Ibid at para 6.           
475 Ibid at para 5.             
476 Ibid at para 7.               
   
 
67 
 
Bartoszek returned home, such as possibly having no apartment, potentially having no one around 
if she fell and being unable to escape if a fire started in another unit.477 On appeal, however, Harris 
J. of the Ontario Superior Court described these risks as a “litany of possible perils” that were 
“speculative” and “applied against … the misty notion that there were insufficient community 
resources to tend to her reasonable specific needs.”478 In finding Mrs. Bartoszek capable, Harris J. 
reminded the respondents that: 
[i]t is mental capacity, not wisdom, that is at issue here. The appellant, Mrs. 
Bartoszek carries with her, like all citizens, the right to be wrong. 
∙∙∙ 
Now that the appellant’s apartment is gone, she has lost her neighbourhood support 
system that was effective, given willingly, and integral to her independence and 
dignity. That turn of events however is not relevant to the requirement of [the 
capacity test].479  
 
Harris J. ordered the respondents to assist Mrs. Bartoszek in obtaining an independent living unit, 
a hearing aid device, home care and a lower bed.480 
 Bartoszek raises legitimate concerns about capable older adults’ decisions not being 
respected, but it can be distinguished from vulnerable adult cases in which a court may be justified 
in exercising its protective jurisdiction. On the stated facts, Bartoszek did not involve an older 
adult whose decision-making abilities were compromised by constraint, undue influence or other 
disabling circumstance. Unlike a lonely older man stuck in the vicious cycle of loneliness, Mrs. 
Bartoszek appeared to be making an unencumbered decision to “live at risk.” Unconstrained by 
maladaptive social cognition, it was a voluntary assumption of risk. 
 Similarly, Koch481 can be distinguished from vulnerable adult situations. Recall that Koch 
involved a woman with multiple sclerosis, and the impugned capacity evaluation inappropriately 
took into account her untidy home and the fact that she pulled a bra out of a bag. This case is 
frequently cited as a leading common law authority for the proposition that adults have the right 
to make “unwise” and “risky” decisions. In finding Koch capable, Quinn J. underscored the 
importance of personal autonomy: 
The right to be foolish is an incident of living in a free and democratic society. 
∙∙∙ 
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The right knowingly to be foolish is not unimportant; the right to voluntarily assume 
risks is to be respected. The State has no business meddling with either. The dignity 
of the individual is at stake.482 
 
There was insufficient evidence that Koch was unable to understand and appreciate the risks and 
consequences of her decisions.483 She more closely resembled the “otherwise incapable” adults 
who were subjected to, or at risk of being subjected to, outdated decision-making regimes that 
historically usurped the rights of people with intellectual, mental and physical disabilities. Like 
the B.C. legislature’s law reform efforts in 1993, Koch placed a premium on autonomy to correct 
the historical mistreatment of people with disabilities. This again pushed the pendulum very far. 
 Koch and the B.C. legislative reforms can be viewed as a response to disability rights 
advocacy which urged stakeholders to allow people with disabilities to live with the “dignity of 
risk.” The “dignity of risk” concept was introduced in 1972 by Robert Perske in relation to people 
with intellectual disabilities.484 Perske argued that people with intellectual disabilities were being 
denied the ability to experience a reasonable and necessary amount of risk which was necessary 
for normal human growth and development.485 He gave three examples of normal human risk-
taking that ought to be extended to people with intellectual disabilities: operating heavy machinery; 
engaging in romantic relationships; and instead of being housed in “super-safe” facilities, living 
in homes that were designed for “normal, happy human beings” and had “plenty of glass, many 
doors to the outside, and lots of brightly colored fixtures.”486  
 Since its emergence over 40 years ago, the “dignity of risk” philosophy has also been 
applied to people with mental and physical disabilities, as well as older adults, although in the 
elder advocacy context, it tends to be captured by slightly different wording (i.e., the right to live 
at risk). Legitimate concerns about overprotection drive the “dignity of risk” movement; however, 
it is problematic to simply apply the philosophy to capable older adults as a carte blanche 
justification for non-intervention. The concept makes sense in the context of remedying 
environments which are too paternalistic in that they prevent individuals from participating in and 
experiencing the real world. When a category of people have become so “smothered” with 
protection, it is appropriate to build in some reasonable and normal risk. For example, care home 
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residents should be allowed to engage in intimate relationships and move around without 
wheelchairs. For overprotected groups, the “dignity of risk” concept is a sword which lets them 
experience normal risk-taking activities of everyday life; it serves to change the status quo. 
However, for lonely older men, the “right to live at risk” approach has morphed into a shield which 
obstructs attempts to intervene in his unwanted and involuntary status quo (recall that loneliness 
is not a choice). The non-interventionist result is troubling because research shows that people tend 
to go along with the current state of affairs and perceive any change as a loss, even if maintaining 
the status quo is an inferior choice.487  
 While status quo bias was initially a behavioural economics concept, it has subsequently 
been studied in other contexts, including healthcare decision-making.488 In the elder care context, 
the bias is arguably on display in Denmark’s preventive home visit program. Under that initiative, 
the country’s municipalities are required by law to offer two annual home visits to all people aged 
75 and over.489 The program is often praised as an example of innovative elder care, but acceptance 
rates have been low. In a recent study, 75 percent of men and 63 percent of women did not take up 
the offer.490 Part of the problem may be attributed to poor invitation procedures such as generic 
letters with no proposed visit date.491 But low participation rates may also be linked to the system’s 
opt-in design; that is, if an individual does not respond to the invitation (and maintains the status 
quo), they are treated as not wanting a visit. Reversing the default option (i.e., making a visit the 
pre-selected choice) may result in more individuals participating in the program; if they do not 
want a visit, they can always take an active step to decline the offer. 
 Combined with the maladaptive cognitive effects of loneliness, a lonely older man may be 
especially prone to preserving the status quo and thus more likely to refuse objectively needed 
services. His resistance may be further reinforced by his declining realm of independence and less 
help-seeking behaviour. Yet advocates hide his symptomatic refusals under the intellectual veneer 
of the “right to live at risk.”  
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 In a similar vein, the statutory presumption of capacity serves to perpetuate the status 
quo.492 I am not suggesting that the presumption should be reversed; it plays a vital role in ensuring 
that people are not considered incapable simply because they are old or have difficulty 
communicating decisions.493 The presumption makes sure that these adults are not stripped of their 
decision-making rights.494 But replacing the capacity/incapacity dichotomy with the concept of 
universal legal capacity exposes the arbitrary exclusion of symptomatic (yet capable) refusers from 
the law’s protective safety net.  
 To be sure, the state cannot help everyone and must draw the line somewhere. The B.C. 
government has chosen to use “incapacity” as the qualifying criteria, although doctrines such as 
undue influence suggest that persons with capacity may not be operating as a free agent.495 The 
Adult Guardianship Act appears to implicitly acknowledge a range of “sub-incapacity” decision-
making constraints, but it then relies upon the presumption of capacity to justify non-intervention 
in relation to vulnerable adults. Section 44 of the AGA states: 
The purpose of [the support and assistance provisions] is to provide for support and 
assistance for adults who are abused or neglected [or self-neglected] and who are 
unable to seek support and assistance because of 
 (a) physical restraint, 
 (b) a physical handicap that limits their ability to seek help, or 
(c) an illness, disease, injury or other condition that affects their ability to 
make decisions about the abuse or neglect [or self-neglect].496 
 
Yet if an abused, neglected or self-neglected adult refuses a support and assistance plan, it must 
not be provided unless there is a finding of incapacity.497 The Act states that a designated agency 
can only apply for a court order authorising the services if the adult appears to be incapable and a 
subsequent assessment arranged by the PGT determines that the adult is incapable.498 It is possible 
to read the AGA as allowing the court to order non-medical services without the court itself making 
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a finding of incapacity, although given the combined effect of the legislative intent and the current 
state of the common law, a court would likely find that incapacity is a prerequisite.  
 On hearing an application for the provision of a support and assistance plan, the Act states 
that a court must consider whether the adult is abused, neglected or self-neglected; is unable to 
seek support and assistance because of an illness, disease, injury or other condition that affects his 
ability to make decisions about the abuse, neglect or self-neglect; and needs and would benefit 
from the proposed services.499 This is the same language used to describe the purpose of the Act, 
and recall that incapacity is not integral to the statutory definitions of abuse, neglect and self-
neglect (unlike jurisdictions such as Newfoundland and Labrador). When considering the criteria, 
the court must take into account the information contained in the incapacity assessment,500 but the 
Act does not explicitly state that the court must find the adult to be incapable.  
 To be sure, the AGA is clear that the support and assistance provisions do not override a 
capable adult’s consent rights in s 4 of the HCCCFA Act,501 but that section applies to health care, 
which is defined as “anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, palliative, diagnostic, 
cosmetic or other purpose related to health.”502 It is possible that an objectively needed home-
based service does not fall squarely within that definition, and may be more appropriately 
categorised as psychosocial, personal or basic care, although the result would likely be the same. 
 In Bentley v Maplewood Seniors Care Society, Greyell J. of the B.C. Supreme Court “found 
that adults have a common law right to consent or refuse consent to personal care services.”503 
Greyell J. turned to the common law because he did not find any B.C. statute which established 
the legislative standard for informed consent to personal or basic care.504 In Bentley, an 83-year-
old woman with advanced Alzheimer’s disease lived in a care home, had very few physical 
movements and was unable to eat independently.505 Care home staff assisted “her with eating and 
drinking by placing a spoon or glass on her lower lip,” and when she opened her mouth, they 
placed the nourishment or liquid in her mouth and she swallowed it.506 If she kept her mouth 
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closed, staff did not force her to eat or drink.507 While capable, Mrs. Bentley had signed a 
“statement of wishes” that she not be given nourishment or liquids if she became unable to take 
part in decisions and if there was no reasonable expectation of her recovery.508 Her family members 
sought a declaration to end the assisted eating and drinking.509 The first issue Greyell J. considered 
was whether Mrs. Bentley was currently capable of making the decision to accept nourishment 
and liquids with assistance.510 Greyell J. found that the Patients Property Act did not apply to this 
task-specific question because the Court was not being asked to make a global finding of incapacity 
(i.e., whether Mrs. Bentley was “incapable of managing herself”).511 Greyell J. also declined to 
apply the HCCCFA Act because it governed health care, not personal or basic care.512 Greyell J. 
noted that the RAA defined “personal care” as matters respecting: 
(a) the shelter, employment, diet and dress of an adult, 
(b) participation by an adult in social, educational, vocational and other activities, 
(c) contact or association by an adult with other persons, and 
(d) licences permits, approvals or other authorizations of an adult to do 
something.513 
 
In the absence of legislation governing consent to personal or basic care, Greyell J. turned to the 
common law and found that it provided authority for the proposition that it is necessary to obtain 
a capable adult’s informed consent before providing personal or basic care.514 He observed that, 
for the consent to be meaningful, the adult must be “capable of understanding the proposed care 
and free from undue influence or coercion.”515 If we apply this analysis to the AGA, which does 
not explicitly state that the court must make an incapacity finding, it seems possible that the court 
could order the provision of services in relation to a capable adult on the basis of undue influence 
or coercion. Taken an incremental step further, the order could be made in relation to capable 
adults who are vulnerable due to internal “disabling circumstances” such as loneliness. 
 Nevertheless, the interpretation that a court may make a statutory support and assistance 
order without finding the person incapable would likely be deemed contrary to the legislative 
                                                 
507 Ibid.                   
508 Ibid at para 5. 
509 Ibid at para 1. 
510 Ibid at para 3. 
511 Ibid at para 44. 
512 Ibid at para 46. 
513 Supra note 61, s 1(“personal care”). 
514 Bentley, supra note 503 at para 46. 
515 Ibid at para 47 [emphasis added].      
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will.516 The AGA’s first guiding principle states that “all adults are entitled to live in the manner 
they wish and to accept or refuse support, assistance or protection as long as they do not harm 
others and they are capable of making decisions about those matters.”517 This guiding principle is 
considerably more “autonomy-preserving” than jurisdictions which also include harm to self. For 
instance, Saskatchewan’s Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act states, in part, that 
adults can refuse support, assistance or protection “as long as they do not harm themselves or 
others.”518 Similar language appears in Newfoundland and Labrador’s Adult Protection Act: “an 
adult is entitled to live in the manner he or she wishes as long as that adult … does not harm 
himself, herself or others.”519 As a result, upon hearing an application under the AGA, there is a 
strong likelihood that a court would only order the provision of services if the court found the adult 
to be incapable. 
 With no AGA remedy available, there is no statutory protection for capable older men 
whose decision-making is compromised by loneliness. In appropriate cases, the superior court’s 
protective jurisdiction ought to fill this legislative gap. Notably, both the AGA and HCCCFA Act 
explicitly preserve a superior court’s parens patriae jurisdiction. Section 62.2(1) of the AGA states: 
Nothing in this Act 
(a) limits the inherent jurisdiction of the court to act in a parens patriae capacity, or 
(b) deprives a person of the right to ask the court to exercise that jurisdiction.520 
 
The HCCCFA Act contains substantially similar wording.521 There is legitimacy to the argument 
that the legislature did not anticipate that the parens patriae jurisdiction might evolve to include 
vulnerable adults who do not lack capacity. That said, I prefer the comments by Lord Griffiths in 
F. As discussed above, he urged his fellow judges to develop the common law in accordance with 
the public interest, and if it was met with public disapproval, the government could always change 
it.522 If the superior courts exercise their protective jurisdiction over lonely older men who are 
                                                 
516 See e.g. British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol 
11 No 24 (7 July 1993) (Hon C Gabelmann) (“should the adult refuse such assistance, there is provision for the 
[designated agency] to seek a court order to require the incapable adult to avail himself or herself of services that 
have been designed to resolve the abuse or neglectful situation” at 8364 [emphasis added]). 
517 BC AGA, supra note 395, s 2(a). 
518 Supra note 61, s 3(c). 
519 Supra note 405, s 8(1)(ii). 
520 Supra note 395, s 62.2(1). 
521 Supra note 175, s 33.4 (4).             
522 Compare Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v D.F.G., [1997] 3 SCR 925, [1997] SCJ No 96: 
The parens patriae jurisdiction has never been used to permit a court to make such decisions for 
competent women, whether pregnant or not. Such a change would not be an incremental change [in 
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refusing objectively needed services, it is open to the legislature to explicitly remove the court’s 
ability to do so with clear and precise statutory language. 
 
ii. Mental health legislation 
It is arguable, but problematic, that the Mental Health Act could potentially be applied to capable 
lonely older men who are refusing objectively needed home-based services, leading to the 
conclusion that the legislature has occupied the field and thus ousted the court’s protective 
jurisdiction. While loneliness is not a mental illness,523 the MHA applies more broadly to a “person 
with a mental disorder,” which the Act defines as “a person who has a disorder of the mind that 
requires treatment and seriously impairs the person’s ability (a) to react appropriately to the 
person’s environment, or (b) to associate with others.”524 Applying a broad and liberal 
interpretation, it is possible that the maladaptive social cognitions associated with loneliness may 
be a “disorder of the mind.” If so, the authorities could certify a capable lonely older man as an 
involuntary patient under the MHA and force psychiatric treatment. Under the psychiatric facility 
leave provisions, the treatment could occur in the community (including in a care home).525 
 Under B.C.’s mental health legislation, there is no requirement that the authorities find the 
person to be incapable of consenting to treatment.526 The requirement for treatment is integral to 
the statutory definition of “person with a mental disorder;” the person’s capacity to consent to 
treatment is irrelevant. The MHA explicitly states that treatment is deemed to be given with an 
involuntary patient’s consent,527 and the HCCCFA Act further clarifies that its health care consent 
provisions do not apply to the psychiatric treatment of involuntary patients.528 Controversially, the 
                                                 
line with authority], but a generic change of major impact and consequence…. If anything is to be 
done, the legislature is in a much better position to weigh the competing interests and arrive at a 
solution that is principled and minimally intrusive to pregnant women (at para 56). 
523 Cacioppo & Patrick, supra note 80 at 230; Ron L. Evans & C. Mary Dingus, “Serving the Vulnerable: Models 
for Treatment of Loneliness” in Hojat & Crandall, supra note 75, 249 at 249. Compare White, supra note 18 (author 
says that adding loneliness to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders “would be an important 
first step in seeing the state as a legitimate, recognizable affliction” at 306). 
524 BC MHA, supra note 175, s 1(“person with a mental disorder”).  
525 Ibid, ss 31(1) & 37.                     
526 But see Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, s 29 (“‘mentally disordered person’, ‘mentally incompetent 
person’, ‘mentally ill person’, or ‘person with a mental disorder’ means a person with a mental disorder as defined in 
section 1 of the Mental Health Act” [emphasis added]). Compare The Mental Health Services Act, SS 1984-85-86, c 
M-13.1 (criteria for involuntary commitment includes a finding that the patient is incapable of making treatment 
decisions, at s 24(2)(a)(ii)); Saskatoon Regional Health Authority v A. B., 2005 SKQB 153, [2005] SJ No 187 at para 
27. 
527 BC MHA, supra note 175, s 31(1). 
528 Supra note 175, ss 2(a)-(d).       
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involuntary treatment provisions were upheld in 1993 as constitutionally valid,529 although it 
remains to be seen whether a court would reach a similar finding today, especially in light of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Starson v Swayze.530 In that case, Major J., writing for the 
majority, stated that “[t]he right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is fundamental to a person’s 
dignity and autonomy,” and that “[t]his right is equally important in the context of treatment for 
mental illness.”531 However, Starson arises out of Ontario, where involuntary patients retain the 
right to refuse treatment, unless they are found incapable under the Health Care Consent Act’s 
general consent provisions.532 That proposition was confirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Fleming v Reid, in which it was held that the determination of involuntary status “is independent 
of any assessment of a patient’s mental competency [to refuse psychiatric treatment].”533 The 
Court confirmed that capable involuntary patients in Ontario have a constitutionally protected right 
to refuse psychiatric treatment.534  
 Even if we classify a lonely older man as “a person with a mental disorder,” the MHA 
would have limited application in resolving the intervention dilemma because the Act applies to 
the provision of psychiatric treatment,535 which likely includes the delivery of cognitive 
behavioural therapy but not the social or personal care services the person is resisting.536 Further, 
using the archaic and potentially unconstitutional MHA to compel a capable lonely older man to 
receive home-based services would be highly controversial and, as we have seen in relation to care 
home admissions, subject to abuse. It is not uncommon for health authorities to use the MHA to 
place an older adult in a care home when he or she is refusing to consent,537 and to also forcibly 
medicate them against their will.538 In 2012, the B.C. Ombudsperson reported that at least 100 
                                                 
529 McCorkell v Riverview Hospital (1993), 104 DLR (4th) 391, 81 BCLR (2d) 273 (SC) (WL Canada) (“The 
purpose of the Act is manifestly plain: the treatment of the mentally disordered who need protection and care in a 
provincial psychiatric hospital” at para 99 [emphasis added]). 
530 2003 SCC 32, [2003] 1 SCR 722 [Starson]. 
531 Ibid at 759.              
532 ON HCCA, supra note 410, s 4(1). 
533 Fleming, supra note 445 at para 8. 
534 Ibid at paras 8, 33 & 35. 
535 BC MHA, supra note 175, s 1(“treatment”). 
536 Compare Louise Holland, Abandonment or Autonomy: How Do Social Workers Know the Difference? (MSW 
Thesis, The University of Northern British Columbia, 2010) [unpublished] at 87-88 (anecdotal evidence that B.C. 
health authorities have used the MHA to force older adults living at home to receive services); Jewish General 
Hospital c S.U., 2015 QCCS 4351 at 28 (authorizing at-home care for outpatient diagnosed with schizophrenia). 
537 See e.g. Holland, ibid at 46, 80 & 117.                
538 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 39th Parl, 4th Sess, Vol 38 No 2 
(14 May 2012) at 1440 (B Simpson). 
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older adults living in residential care were involuntary patients detained under the MHA.539 The 
practice of using the MHA as a backdoor admissions mechanism is troubling because involuntary 
detention carries serious implications for older adults. For instance, involuntary patients in 
residential care can be given anti-psychotic medications without consent, even outside of 
emergency situations. The MHA was not enacted for that express purpose.540 Indeed, the 
government has acknowledged this inappropriate use and may be developing a clear policy on the 
matter.541  
 
d. The orders 
When a superior court invokes its protective jurisdiction over a lonely older man, it has the 
potential to make flexible, responsive remedies. For example, it could simultaneously authorise 
the provision of home support services such as meals on wheels, and cognitive behavioural therapy 
to address the underlying maladaptive social cognition which may be contributing to the refusal. 
Over time, the therapy may help lift the lonely older man out of the behavioural confirmation loop 
of loneliness, thus removing at least one decision-making constraint on his willingness to accept 
the objectively needed in-home services. Therefore, like the orders made under s 54 of the Adult 
Guardianship Act, the protective jurisdiction orders should terminate one year after they are made 
or on an earlier date specified by the court.542 They could also be changed, canceled or renewed to 
reflect the changing or ongoing needs of the lonely older man. 
 
e. Most effective, less intrusive measures 
While the protective jurisdiction allows for flexible orders, the courts must choose the most 
effective, less intrusive measures. This aspect of the proposed framework warrants discussion 
because case law reveals that this principle is not consistently applied in analogous situations in 
which older adults refuse home-based services. In particular, a line of Ontario cases demonstrate 
that refusers are often deemed incapable of making a care home admission decision, which means 
                                                 
539 B.C. Ombudsperson, Public Report No 47, “The Best of Care: Getting it Right for Seniors in British Columbia 
(Part 2)” vol 2 (February 2012), online: <https://www.bcombudsperson.ca> at 265. 
540 Ibid at 270.     
541 B.C. Ombudsperson, “Update on Status of Recommendations: Public Report No 47, The Best of Care: Getting it 
Right for Seniors in British Columbia (Part 2)” (June 2015), online: <https://www.bcombudsperson.ca> at 31.  
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they can be institutionalised against their will. The less intrusive option of providing the home-
based services to the non-consenting adult is missed.  
 For jurisdictional consistency, I would have ideally analysed B.C. case law, specifically in 
relation to applications under s 54(1) of the Adult Guardianship Act for an order authorising the 
provision of services for adults aged 65 and over who had refused a statutory support and assistance 
plan and were assessed as incapable of making that decision. However, there is a dearth of 
applications. Searching legal databases (for all adult ages) returned only one result, and in any 
event, the authorities in that case did not pursue an application under s 54(1).543 I also confirmed 
this lack of case law through information requests I made to the local health authorities, in which 
I asked for data from 2013 and 2014. In response, three of the five authorities stated that they had 
made no s 54(1) applications in relation to adults aged 65 and over who had refused a support and 
assistance plan and were assessed as incapable of making that decision.544 Among the remaining 
two authorities, one stated that it did not record the information as requested,545 and the other did 
not respond to my questions. B.C. also lacks a statutory care home admissions process for 
“incapable” adults who do not have a substitute decision-maker already in place,546 so unlike 
Ontario, there is not a clear group of cases on this discrete matter. 
 I will now turn to the Ontario cases. J.W. (Re) involved an 88-year-old divorced man with 
a history of medical problems.547 He lived alone, and his children reported that he was losing 
weight, eating poorly and “the only foods on hand were cookies and some canned foods.”548 They 
also discovered that his fridge had stopped working.549 While in hospital after a medical 
emergency, J.W. saved all of his menus which included instructions on his nutritional needs; he 
said that once he was home, he would use the menus and buy the necessary groceries to make a 
meal.550 His doctor had concerns about this occurring, as J.W. had not previously done his own 
shopping and he required assistance with activities of daily living.551 His daughter testified that he 
did not cook, was difficult to access because he did not like to wear his hearing aid and thus did 
                                                 
543 Bentley, supra note 503 at paras 32 & 137. 
544 Email from Vancouver Coastal Health Authority to author (10 September 2015); letter from Fraser Health 
Authority to author (10 September 2015); email from Island Health to author (8 September 2015). 
545 Letter from Northern Health to author (15 September 2015). 
546 Part 3 of the HCCCFA Act, supra note 175 creates a process, but the provisions are unproclaimed. 
547 2005 CanLII 57810 (ON CCB) at 3. 
548 Ibid at 4. 
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not hear the phone, and that he got agitated and angry when she attempted to explain to him that 
he was getting more forgetful.552 J.W. expressed frustration with his doctor; he was clearly 
annoyed that his doctor had written to the Ministry of Transportation regarding concerns about 
him continuing to drive.553 J.W. refused to consider suggestions for home support, including meals 
on wheels and cleaning, cooking and laundry services.554 He told his family that under no 
circumstances would he allow any outside helpers into his home, and called the suggestion of a 
home care nurse “ridiculous” and “completely unnecessary.”555 He also refused to discuss long-
term care options, and said going into a nursing home was “almost like solitary confinement,” and 
that he would lose his independence and not be able to do the things he enjoyed such as playing 
golf, driving and swimming at his cottage.556 In finding J.W. incapable of making a care home 
admission decision, the CCB panel member stated: 
There is little doubt that throughout his life Mr. W. has been a very talented man, 
including in his professional life. However, he now faces some challenges 
regarding his activities of daily living and medical care that he is unable to 
appreciate or acknowledge…. He is unable to appreciate the benefits of any 
alternative courses of action, including assistance through the provision of home 
care services. This is not as a result of any failure on the part of the medical team 
to adequately inform Mr. W. of the options proposed, and the risks, benefits and 
consequences of any decision in this regard. Rather, it is directly related to 
limitations associated with Mr. W.’s mental capabilities.557 
 
Yet he was not compelled to receive home-based supports; instead, the decision allowed a third 
party to force him into long-term care against his will. Such an outcome is hardly less intrusive. 
Using the superior courts’ protective jurisdiction has the potential to result in less intrusive 
intervention than currently happens. 
 Further, recall the case of M.G.558 M.G. was the 77-year-old woman who brought the 
garbage bag with her to the capacity hearing. She would initially accept and then cancel community 
care support. In finding her incapable of making a care home admission decision, the panel 
member noted that community resources had been made available to her on multiple occasions, 
but that she had shown “a pattern of rejecting the assistance which [was] consistently offered to 
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her.”559 Yet she was not compelled to receive the community supports; instead, the decision 
allowed her to be institutionalised against her will. 
 A string of other cases reflect a similar pattern. In R.L. (Re), an 80-year-old woman who 
lived alone “was not permitting any assistance whatsoever except for some once weekly help from 
a neighbor;” she was found incapable of making a care home admission decision.560 The same 
result occurred in NK (Re), which involved a 79-year-old woman who lived living alone “in a state 
of squalor” and refused to let care providers change her soiled undergarments.561 It is arguable that 
institutionalising her against her will may not resolve her unwillingness to let others change her 
undergarments.562 It may be more convenient for care providers, but convenience should never be 
a justification for trampling someone’s decision-making rights over their own body.563 Further, in 
Z (Re), an 86-year-old widow who lived alone was found incapable; she refused meals on meals 
and would not use a pill organizer or wear a Lifeline bracelet which would quickly summon help 
if she fell.564 The panel member noted: 
She needed to be monitored and she had no realistic plan for that to happen. There 
were steps that a capable person who appreciated the risks could have taken. She 
could have applied for more in-home nursing care, she could have had all of her 
meals prepared and delivered, she could have worn a bracelet that would summon 
help immediately if she fell, she could have used a pill organizer.565 
 
These cases can be contrasted with RH (Re).566 In that case, a 68-year-old divorced man who lived 
alone was found incapable, but he was already receiving the maximum available home and 
community supports, including meals on wheels and help with cleaning and bathing.567  
 In fairness to the panel members, it is important to point out that their hands were tied. 
They were tasked with determining whether the adults were incapable of making a care home 
admission decision, not whether they were incapable of refusing in-home services. While the CCB 
has jurisdiction over “personal assistance services,” these services are limited to those which are 
provided in long-term care settings, not an adult’s own home.568 Nevertheless, there are a few cases 
                                                 
559 Ibid at 8.           
560 2004 CanLII 57258 (ON CCB) at 3 & 9. 
561 2014 CanLII 51744 (ON CCB) at 2 & 8. 
562 Ibid at 12. 
563 See e.g., F, supra note 204 at 571 (per Lord Jauncey).  
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566 2014 CanLII 49869 (ON CCB). 
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in which the panel member explicitly acknowledges options less intrusive than involuntary 
institutionalisation. For instance, recall the case of BS, which involved an 85-year-old Italian 
woman who needed 24-hour care to remain at home.569 The panel member found the woman 
incapable, but encouraged her children to explore alternatives short of involuntary placement: “As 
a matter purely of obiter…, I would encourage B.S.’s offspring to consider exploring all available 
means of maintaining her in her own home with live-in care (including some novel financial 
instruments designed expressly to assist elderly homeowners with no income).”570 A panel member 
made a similar observation in W.Mc. (Re).571 In that case, the authorities believed that an incapable 
83-year-old man (W.Mc.) with several health conditions should be in long-term care, not his own 
home; however, his substitute decision-maker would not consent to placement.572 W.Mc. was 
“very resistant to care,” although he received assistance with activities such as bathing, dressing 
and foot care.573 Care workers reported concerns such as “lack of food, client naked on couch, 
soiled incontinent product and clothes, dried blood and feces in bath tub, dog feces throughout the 
house and bruising on W.Mc.’s face.”574 The panel member noted that if he was institutionalised, 
he would be unable to do many of the things he enjoyed such as looking at the lake and watching 
television all through the night.575 While there were some benefits of being in a care home (e.g., 
efficient medication administration), the panel member concluded that admission would not 
improve his quality of life; in fact, it may well have had the opposite effect in that he could have 
become depressed and/or aggressive when dealing with the changes.576 Keeping him at home with 
24-hour professional care was “clearly” a course of action which was available, appropriate and 
less restrictive, although the panel member acknowledged that she had no mechanism to enforce 
this outcome.577 
 
                                                 
569 Supra note 117.  
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572 Ibid at 4 & 5. 
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2. Practical challenges 
Effectively invoking the superior courts’ protective jurisdiction has potential practical challenges. 
I will address three of the most pressing difficulties.  
 
a. Limited resources 
The first challenge is one of limited resources, especially in relation to home care and mental health 
services such as CBT. Court orders are only as effective as the services under it, so authorizing 
care, support and therapies for refusers may overwhelm an already overburdened system. Going 
to court can also be cumbersome.578 Resource scarcity may be most acute in rural and remote areas, 
although creative delivery mechanisms such as telepsychiatry have the potential to open up 
geographic boundaries at least in relation to mental health services.579 There is also promising 
evidence of some increased interest in older adults’ mental health,580 which are challenging the 
outdated belief that conditions such as depression and loneliness are inevitable parts of aging. 
Further, the shortage of services may be overstated. For example, in D.R. (re), a doctor found that 
a 61-year-old involuntary patient was incapable of making a care home admission decision.581 The 
witness testified that care home placement was appropriate for D.R. because, inter alia, “she 
needed help with some activities of daily living such as shopping, meal preparation and cooking, 
and that assistance could not be sufficiently provided by publicly funded community-based 
services, or by her family.”582 The witness said that apart from care home admission, the authorities 
could provide a social worker and limited nursing services about once or twice a week, but not 
daily or twice daily as D.R. required.583 However, when pressed further, the witness testified that 
it was possible that a publicly-funded nurse could come in to monitor her medications twice daily, 
                                                 
578 A.M.S., Re, 1993 CanLII 8329 (NL SCTD) (“there may be merit in devising a scheme, with built in safeguards, 
for the provision of consents to medical treatment for mentally incompetent persons even where no advance 
directive exists, so as to avoid the cumbersome application in every case to court for exercise of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction” at para 40 in obiter). 
579 See e.g. O’Leary, supra note 199 at 98; Gretchen A. Brenes et al, “Telephone-Delivered Cognitive Behavioral 
Therapy and Telephone-Delivered Nondirective Supportive Therapy for Rural Older Adults With Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder: A Randomized Clinical Trial” (August 2015) JAMA Psychiatry 
doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2015.1154. 
580 Laidlaw & Thompson, supra note 148 at 93; Mary Beth M. Cresci, “Challenges of aging: The impact of 
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and that the Canadian Mental Health Association could possibly get involved by having psychiatric 
nurses visit once or twice a week.584 
 
b. Enforceability 
The second challenge relates to enforceability. Even if the services are available, a lonely older 
man may still be unwilling to receive the home support or participate in CBT. Unlike an 
involuntary patient under a community treatment order, the lonely older man is not faced with the 
prospect of being returned to the psychiatric ward if he does not comply with the provision of 
services, and unlike incapable adults, he does not face the threat of being placed in a care home. 
Without “consequences,” it may be difficult to make him comply. He may simply refuse to open 
his door. Breaking it down to deliver his meals on wheels is overly drastic. So is finding him in 
contempt of court. This practical dilemma is a legitimate concern, because if it cannot be resolved, 
situations may either escalate or fizzle out to the point that service providers eventually give-up. 
It also ties back to the limited resources challenge. Gaining a lonely older man’s trust and 
cooperation may be particularly difficult if the same workers are not always be available. This 
problem was evident in HH (Re), where an 88-year-old woman was only comfortable with certain 
nurses and would refuse to let others into her house.585 
 
c. Service provider safety 
The third challenge relates to service provider safety. A symptomatic refuser’s reaction to court 
ordered services could be extreme, including physical aggression. In L.M. (Re), the authorities 
wanted to keep a 79-year-old woman with chronic paranoid schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease 
and hypertension as an involuntary patient in part because home care was no longer suitable.586 
She was often non-compliant with her medication, and had been found “malnourished, naked and 
psychotic.”587 The nurse involved with supervising her home care testified that the woman’s home 
was unsafe for service providers: she had pushed a worker, was verbally abusive and the nurse had 
exhausted four agencies in search for a home care worker because none of those who had initially 
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taken the assignment would return.588 In maintaining her involuntary status, the panel member 
noted that no home care services would be available because she had exhausted those community 
resources, and therefore, she would be in great danger.589 Similarly, LD (Re) involved a 66-year-
old man who lived alone and was initially assessed as being incapable of making a care home 
admission decision.590 While the panel member ultimately disagreed with this finding, the assessor 
noted that LD had a history of conflict with and resistance to personal support workers, especially 
in relation to his inability or refusal to refrain from smoking when they visited, and this resulted 
in a care provider organization saying that it would reduce and withdraw services.591  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
588 Ibid at 6. See also E.G. (Re), 2007 CanLII 46902 (ON CCB) (home care client would get angry and 
uncooperative when attempts were made to help her). 
589 L.M., ibid at 11. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I proposed an intervention approach to loneliness which overcomes the legal fiction 
of capacity, and responds to the paradoxically self-defeating behaviour associated with the 
emotional condition. In particular, I argued that a superior court’s protective jurisdiction may be 
invoked to help lonely older men age-in-place by ordering objectively needed in-home services. 
Using the law to respond to loneliness may seem heavy-handed, but other intervention approaches 
assume a consenting participant. Even the most effective cognitive behavioural-based strategies 
proceed on this assumption. Legal interventions are not inherently oppressive; the law can be 
applied in therapeutic ways which improve people’s well-being. However, current legal 
approaches to symptomatic refusals do not realise this potential. Instead, lonely older men are 
either categorised as incapable—an outcome which can lead to unnecessary institutionalisation, or 
abandoned in the name of the “right to live at risk.” From active aging and libertarian perspectives, 
their refusals are celebrated as an exercise of free choice. But this reduces lonely older men to 
pawns, unwittingly serving someone else’s agenda and thus suffering needlessly. In contrast to 
this approach, invoking a superior court’s protective jurisdiction extends a supportive hand to those 
stuck in the vicious cycle of loneliness. In my view, this is the preferred way forward.     
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